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Abstract

Scholarship on the intersection between populism and the environment is growing. These
works generally describe populist parties as negatively disposed toward the environment. For
instance, those parties are seen as promoting climate denial and skepticism, and as resisting proenvironmental policies and partnerships. Scholars have offered three types of explanations to
account for such negative positions: structural, ideological, and strategic. While valuable, these
works suffer from three important limitations: they predominantly focus on populist parties from
Europe, consider only right-wing populist parties, and give little attention to parties with
potentially more positive approaches to the environment.
This thesis addresses these limitations by extending the analysis to Latin America and the
U.S., left-leaning parties, and parties that adopt broadly pro-environmental agendas. The
empirical analysis shows the landscape is significantly more varied than is currently understood.
The thesis then argues that, despite the observable variations, populist parties’ environmental
agendas are ultimately anchored in their populist rhetoric. They are specifically grounded in
three key populist features: people-centricity, nationalism, and anti-elitism. With that in mind,
there are considerable variations in how these parties articulate the populist framing of their
environmental agendas to fit their distinctive brand of populism. Overall, this thesis advances a
fuller understanding of populism and populist parties’ relationship to the environment.
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I. Introduction

Over the past decade, scholars and journalists alike have observed the proliferation of
populism across the world which have brought waves of shocks, worries, and even fanaticism in
its wake (e.g. Inglehart & Norris, 2016; Lewis, Barr, et al., 2019; Moffitt, 2016). Europe has
become a particularly fertile breeding ground for populist parties. In the 2018 round of European
national elections, one in four votes was cast for populist parties, compared to only 7% in 1998
(Lewis, Clarke, Barr, Holder, & Kommenda, 2019). Paralleling the events in Europe has been the
rise of populist leaders to prominence and power across other parts of the world such as Donald
Trump in the United States, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, and Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines.
Populists often attract supporters with ideologies, platforms and styles that are rarely
expressed in traditional party politics. They have also adopted anti-elite, nationalist, and antiglobalization (or anti-immigration) positions. Many are boosted by the use of emotional and
personal language, as opposed to official terminologies. With this unconventional approach to
politics, populist parties have enjoyed considerable success across the world. To account for their
ascent to power and their unique appeals to voters, sociologists and political scientists alike have
sought to both define populism, and to explain why it has appealed to so many voters worldwide.
In defining populism, academics have generally followed Cas Mudde’s (2004) classical
definition of populism as a thin-centered ideology. This definition makes sense of the populist
parties’ considerable variations, diversity of political stances, and malleability across traditional
left-right party lines.
To account for the success of populism, scholars have identified several unique features
that have helped populist candidates to attract voters. Central to populism is the powerful yet
vaguely defined binary between the corrupt elite and the virtuous people. The former can refer to
6

any economic, political, media, or international elite who is believed to be undermining the wellbeing and interests of a morally virtuous people who have lost ground in an elite-dominated
political and social sphere. The boundaries around how populists define “the people” often
intersect with the borders of a state. This facilitates the incorporation of nationalistic sentiments.
Populist leaders insert themselves into this choreographed binary by branding themselves as the
political outsider and authentic representative of the people vis-à-vis the political status quo
governed by the elites. In order to do so, they often interact directly with their voter base through
social media, advocating for direct democracy to replace representative democracy as the ideal
way to represent the common people.
Paralleling the rise of populism on the global stage has been the rise of environmental
concerns, movements, and governmental actions in the context of the already rapidly warming
(or heating) climate, more frequent occurrences of extreme weather and natural disasters, and
increasingly alarming scientific knowledge of the irreversibility of the catastrophic,
anthropogenic changes to the planet. Likewise, this field has attracted considerable attention
from scholars hoping to make sense of state governments’ directions and decisions on key issues
of environmental governance.
At the nexus of these two bourgeoning fields is the budding research on the connection
between populism and the environment. A large proportion of these studies has shown a
generally negative correlation between populist parties and their views on the environment. This
takes the form of, for instance, the promotion of supporters’ climate denial and climate
skepticism (e.g. R. A. Huber, 2020), and persistent opposition to environmental policies and
partnerships (e.g. Riedel, 2021).

7

In order to account for this trend, three types of explanations have been offered.
Lockwood (2018) suggested two of them. The first is “structural,” focusing on economic and
interest-based factors tying right-wing populist parties’ appeals to grassroots supporters’ desires.
The second is “ideological,” centering on the right-wing populists’ “anti-elite, socially
conservative, and nationalist values and their aversion to globalism, liberalism, and the loss of
national sovereignty” (Buzogány & Mohamad-Klotzbach, 2021, p. 157). The ideological
explanation has been more widely received and supported in the literature. This is evidenced by a
special issue of Annals of the American Association of Geographers which investigates several
Latin American and Asian populist regimes’ use of nationalist populist appeals to justify the
aggressive extraction of natural resources (e.g. Kojola, 2019; McCarthy, 2019; Saguin, 2019). A
third, and newer, explanation links the populist parties’ positions on environmental issues to the
strategic seizure of political opportunities (e.g. Oswald, Fromm, & Broda, 2021).
Recently, some researchers have also begun investigating the development of some farright populist parties’ unusual support for certain pro-environmental policies in Europe, under
the framework of green patriotism (e.g. Ćetković & Hagemann, 2020; François & Adrien, 2021).
These works have offered important insight into the connections between populism and
the environmental. However, they present three key limitations: they predominantly focus on
populist parties from Europe; they consider only right-wing populist parties; and they give little
attention to parties with broadly pro-environmental approaches.
In light of the literature’s limitations, this thesis aims to show that the landscape of
populist parties’ environmental agendas is significantly more varied and nuanced than is
currently understood. Populist parties across the political spectrum have presented both antienvironmental and pro-environmental agendas. Their environmental agendas also pertain to a

8

broad constellation of possibilities regarding their environmental rhetoric, stances, and policy
proposals, and cover a wide range of environmental issues on natural resources (e.g. fossil fuels,
minerals), air and water pollution, energy generation, land use, biodiversity and international
climate governance. With that said, all populist parties’ environmental agendas are ultimately
anchored, in their specific renditions, in populist rhetoric. Specifically, they are grounded in
three key populist features: people-centricity, nationalism, and anti-elitism.
Building on these core findings, the discussion chapter presents these case studies’
contributions to new ways of understanding populism with regards to populist parties’ core and
secondary issues, an outward-facing construction of the enemy in populism, and populist parties’
rare consensus on acknowledging environmental problems.
I conduct four case studies to illustrate these arguments. Each case study focuses on one
populist party chosen by a combination of two variables: party family (right-wing or left-wing)
and positions of environmental agendas (pro-environment or anti-environment). One reason for
choosing these cases is to reflect geographical diversity across Europe, North and South
America. These variations demonstrate the consistency of the populist anchors underlying these
parties’ environmental agendas across the spectrum. The four cases are: the U.S. Republic Party
under Donald Trump (right-wing, anti-environment), the French National Rally under Marine Le
Pen (right-wing, anti-environment), the Spanish Podemos under Pablo Iglesias (left-wing, proenvironment), and Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro’s populist Socialist regime in Venezuela
(left-wing, anti-environment).
Chapters II and III are a review of the scholarly literature on the core elements of
populism, and on populism’s intersection with the environment. Chapter IV outlines the
methodology for this empirical investigation. Chapters V-VIII present evidence and analysis
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from the four case studies. Chapters IX and X discuss key findings and reflect on their broader
implications for populist parties’ relationship with the environment, and populism at large.

10

II. Key Characteristics of Populism

Following the rise of populism across the world has been a growing interest in
understanding it. Yet the approaches to define, operationalize, and conceptualize populism are
numerous and diverse. Populism is an “essentially contested concept given that scholars even
contest the essence and usefulness of the concept” (Gallie, 2019; Mudde, 2017, p. 27)
As crucial as various theoretical conceptualizations and debates on populism are, the
focus of this thesis is concerns over the practical analysis of populist parties’ rhetoric on the
environment. In order to analyze populist parties’ environmental agendas and demonstrate that
they are ultimately anchored in core populist elements, I synthesize two central properties and
five key elements of populism from the literature which are particularly relevant to this thesis’s
four case studies. These characteristics overlap and reinforce each other. I elaborate upon each
one in the sections below.
The first two sections discuss the two central theoretical properties of populism identified
by scholars: 1) populism as a thin-centered ideology, and 2) populism as a discursive and
rhetorical approach. These two properties act as cornerstones for identifying and understanding
populism in various contexts. Sections 3-7 elaborate on five core elements shared by many
populist parties across the globe. 1 They are the backbones for the analysis of populist parties’
environmental agendas in this thesis. These characteristics are: 3) the bifurcated construction of
“the people” against “the elites”; 4) the evil elites and enemies of the people; 5) the virtuous and

Even though I only identify three populist features as prominent anchors for populist parties'
environmental rhetoric in this thesis, all five of these populist elements introduced in this chapter
are essential to understanding populism. Each element is indeed leveraged by different populist
parties at varying degrees in the framing of their environmental agendas.
1
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homogenous people; 6) malleability across party lines; and 7) direct democracy and antiestablishment tendencies.

1. A Thin-centered Ideology
As contentious as the discussions around the essence of populism are, Cas Mudde’s
(2004) classical definition of populism as a “thin-centered ideology” remains at the core of the
concept. He stated, “Populism is only a ‘thin-centered ideology’, exhibiting ‘a restricted core
attached to a narrower range of political concepts…[and it] can be easily combined with very
different (thin and full) other ideologies, including communism, ecologism, nationalism or
socialism’” (Freeden, 1998, p. 750; Ibid, 544). Taggart (2004, p. 274) resonated with this
definition by pointing out that populism “lacks core values.” He explained that populist parties’
core values depend on the kind of heartland (see Section 4 below) to which they attach
themselves. This leads to considerable variations in populist parties across the world.
Populist parties vary in terms of their views and expressions of politics, economics and
social issues (Hawkins, 2009), as well as in terms of political agendas, cutting across traditional
divisions such as those between right- and left-wing parties (e.g. Moffitt & Tormey, 2014), and
between inclusive and exclusive stances targeting different groups (e.g. Duina & Carson, 2019).
Mudde and Kaltwasser (2013, 2017) have pointed out that populism’s malleability facilitates its
continued relevance across countries over the years because it can adapt to any specific policy
issue or stance due to the lack of a thick ideological core.
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2. A Discursive and Rhetorical Approach
Unlike most ideology-rich political approaches such as liberalism and Marxism,
populism has minimal ideological attachment, and hence many consider it to be a “discursive
frame,” a “political style,” a “repertoire of performance,” or a “political discursive logic”
(Bonikowski, 2016, p. 14; Curato, 2017, p. 146; Staufer, 2021, p. 225). This makes populism a
“strategic tool selected based on contexts” (Bonikowski, 2016, p. 14) tailored to the “rhetoric,
emotional appeals, embodied practices, and narratives” used by populist leaders across the
spectrum (Agnew & Shin, 2017; Jansen, 2011; Moffitt, 2016).
The discursive understanding of populism entails that political leaders can employ
populist discourses as long as they adhere to the populist core of the conflict between the people
and the elites (see Section 3 below). As opposed to other political ideologies, populism is not a
fixed political position to be claimed by any individual or political party, but a convenient choice
of framing employed at varying degrees and intensities on different issues that render them
“‘more or less’ populist” at different times (Moffitt, 2016, p. 21).

3. The Bifurcated Construction of the “People” Against the “Elites”
Indeed, populism’s properties as a thin-centered ideology and a discursive approach can
render it flexible and adaptive. Yet, the most consistent characteristic of populism identified with
broad scholarly consensus is its core framing of the conflict between “the people” and “the
elites”. This conflict is central to Mudde’s (2004, p. 543) definition of populism “as an ideology
that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups,
‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an
expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.” Foundational to a populist
13

discourse is the "normative distinction between 'the elite' and 'the people'" (Mudde, 2004, p.
544). Populism exemplifies a “Manichean outlook, in which there are only friends and foes.
Opponents are not just those with different priorities and values, they are evil! Consequently,
compromise is impossible, as it “corrupts the purity” (Ibid., de la Torre, 2018, p. 738; Oliver &
Rahn, 2016). In addition, this antagonism is considered black-and-white; there is no middle
ground or overlap between the two groups. Populists are suspicious of any political, economic,
or cultural claim the elites make as they vow to listen to and follow the common wisdom of the
people (Mudde, 2004; Oliver & Rahn, 2016; Stanley, 2008)
Yet the category of these two groups—the people and the elites—is not a “natural” or
customary category in politics or society. Populists go to great lengths to construct and modify
the identities of both groups and this binary through their rhetoric. Laclau (2005a) saw populism
not as a political product but as a process in which the people are repeatedly named, defined, and
articulated by the populists in various political debates (Laclau, 2005a, 2005b; Moffitt, 2016, pp.
23-24). This intrinsically dynamic model of populism is of great value and opens a wide range of
possibilities to analyze the changing dynamics between the people and the elites at any given
time, or on any given issue to unpack populist narratives.

4. The Evil Elites and the Enemies of the People
The elites are easier to define as a group within the populist “bifurcated construction”.
This designation generally refers to individuals who hold certain levels of power, authority or
privilege in a given society. Examples of elites could include politicians, journalists, academics
or business leaders. (Bonikowski, 2016, p. 10). They exert a disproportionate amount of power
over the operations and organization of society. Yet, regardless of this power’s legitimacy,
14

populists vilify any member of the elites and deem them the enemy of the people. Their problem
is the “elites’ abandonment of the common good in favor of their own self-interest” (Ibid, p. 11);
they are often portrayed as selfish, corrupt, and out of touch with the real people, and blamed as
the source of crisis and of ordinary people’s plight in societies. These qualities facilitate
populists’ vilification and demonization of the elite as antagonistic to the virtuous people.
Recently, Staufer (2021, p. 225) has expanded this categorization of the elite in the
populist dualism by arguing that populism is a “political discursive logic whose normative
ideational core is the juxtaposition of ‘the people’ as the group it claims to represent with one or
several particular antagonists.” The elite in the classic populist dichotomy is broadened to
include larger, more malleable “other groups.” In this way, groups that are not conventionally
associated with elitist privileges can also be antagonized, such as people of color or immigrants.
As the antagonistic groups get expanded, the construction and conceptualization of the people as
a vague but unified group become more crucial for populists in anchoring their rhetoric. The next
section details how the people come to be, and what the people entail, in the populist rhetoric.

5. Constructing the Virtuous and Homogenous People
In contrast with populists’ construction of “the evil elites”, “the people” are glorified with
desirable qualities such as decency, diligence, honesty, and championship of the common sense.
They are often portrayed as the victims of elites’ actions which ignore, silence, and exploit them
in all aspects of their lives. By glorifying and victimizing the ordinary people, populist leaders
present themselves as the authentic representative of the virtuous people against the evil elites
via “acquisition of political power…on behalf of the people” (Bonikowski, 2016, p. 11; Mudde,
2004, p. 558). Populist leaders claim that “they speak for the ‘silent majority’ of ‘ordinary,
15

decent people’ whose interests and opinions are (they claim) regularly overridden by arrogant
elites, corrupt politicians, and strident minorities” (Canovan, 1999, p. 5).
Nevertheless, the definition of the people and the boundaries around them are ambiguous.
Bonikowski (2016, p. 11) has suggested that populist leaders purposefully choose not to specify
the scope of the people in order to maximize their base. “The people” generally refers to
everyone but the elites, anchored in the fundamental antagonism between these two groups.
Brubaker’s theory of vertical opposition supports this relational definition of “the people” as they
are “defined not only in relation to those on top but also—still in the vertical dimension—in
relation to those on the bottom” (2017, 363).
In some cases, the boundaries drawn for “the people” correlate with the boundaries of the
nation (not the state), appealing to economic and social nationalism (Jansen, 2011). Mudde
(2004, p. 549) has suggested that, for populism, “the step from ‘the nation’ to ‘the people’ is
easily taken, and the distinction between the two is often far from clear.” The nation can be
understood as an “imagined community” that cohesively binds its citizens (Duina & Carson,
2019, p. 6). Whoever is included in the “imagined community” is considered a member of the
people. In this way, the definition of “the people” is dependent on exclusion because “the people
are understood as a bounded collectivity, and the basic contrast is between inside and outside”
(Brubaker, 2017b, p. 363). Along these lines, populists often construct, as opposed to the people,
outside threats and crises that catalyze the exclusive boundary around the people who can only
be defended by populist parties (Agnew and Shin 2017; Balthazar 2017; Kenny 2017).
Similar but more inclusive than the idea of nationalism as the basis for defining “the
people”. Taggart (2004, p. 274) introduced the concept of the “heartland” which “represents an
idealized conception of the community they serve. It is from this territory of the imagination that
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populists construct the ‘people’ as the object of their politics.” The heartland appeals as a
primordial basis for individuals’ shared identity (Taggart, 2000). The image of the heartland is
constructed from an idealized past for which the people are nostalgic, and the populists aim to
bring back a desirable past with “a good life before the corruptions and distortions of the
present” (Ibid.). Yet “the people” belonging to the heartland are fixed in an endless process of
being named and defined, as “heartlands are something that is felt rather than
reasoned…different positions can implicitly conjure up heartlands that differ from each other”
(Taggart, 2004, p. 275). The heartland is as malleable and subject to change as any concepts
employed in the populist rhetoric, meaning the people representative of the heartland change
accordingly too.
Despite these subtle variations and fluidity in the construction of “the people,” it is
ultimately “a homogeneous and virtuous community” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013, p. 151) that
lacks internal division or further categorization as opposed to the disparate groups included
under “the elites.” Albertazzi and McDonnell (2008, p. 3) provide an informative summary of
populists’ conceptualization of the people and the elites in their study of contemporary Western
European populism. They define populism as “an ideology which pits a virtuous and
homogenous people against a set of elites and dangerous “others” who are collectively depicted
as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity,
identity, and voice.”

6. Malleability Across Party Lines
As mentioned above, populism is a thin-centered ideology with specific values attached
to it. This lack of core ideological attachments renders it malleable, capable of “adjust[ing] to
17

[the] perceptions & needs of different societies” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013, p. 150). One area
of adaptability that separates populist parties from most traditional political parties is their
meltability across party lines.
Firstly, populist parties are able to reside on different ends of the political spectrum to
“cut across substantively quite different forms of politics” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013, p. 151).
Both the political right and the political left use populism by adjusting their definitions of “the
people” and “the elites” based on various host ideologies to which they adhere (Mudde, 2004,
pp. 548-550).
It could be argued that since populist parties merge with those from either side of the
political spectrum, there is little value in distinguishing between right- and left-wing populism.
However, scholars have found substantial variation between left- and right-wing populist
articulation and stances on various issues. This further buttresses populists’ adaptability to
disparate political traditions and social contexts. Right-wing populist parties tend to define “the
people” based on exclusionary ethnic constructs and the idea that “the enemies of the people are
identified as minority populations” (de la Torre, 2018, p. 744). Brubaker (2017b, p. 363) has
suggested that for left-wing parties, the people’s bounded collectivity is usually defined by
political or economic concerns such as outside threats from unregulated globalization or
economic imperialism. Yet, populist parties can even blend and cross ideologies from both the
right and the left, as long as they adhere to the core “people v. elite” dichotomy (see Duina &
Carson, 2019).
Additionally, political actors possess the freedom to choose whether and when to use
populist rhetoric. Politicians can switch it on and off under different circumstances. Mudde
(2004, p. 545) has observed that “many of the quintessential contemporary ‘populists’ do not
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always use a populist discourse.” Because of its lack of attachment to certain ideologies,
populism is deployed by politicians at different stages of their political careers according to their
needs. Bonikowski (2016, p. 15) has found that as politicians progress through their careers, they
tend to employ less populist narrative and switch back to adherence to the more traditional party
lines for rhetorical and campaign strategies.

7. Anti-establishment and Fighting for Direct Democracy
Despite the thin-centeredness of populist ideology, politicians and parties who rely on
populist rhetoric tend to use similar strategies to set the blueprint for their policies.
Counterintuitive to their often aggressive and radical appearances and their dismay with existing
elite political institutions, populists do not seek to overturn the structure underpinning society.
Populism is, after all “reformist rather than revolutionary”, and it does “not want to change the
people themselves, but rather their status within the political system” (Mudde, 2004, p. 546).
Ultimately, populists seek to change who are elected to represent the people in the governing
body. They position themselves as the authentic representative of the people as opposed to the
parties in power which are labelled as elites. Populist parties have “presented themselves as the
exact opposites of the established parties…championing the common sense & decent values of
‘the people’” (Ibid., 548).
In addition, populism also emphasizes democracy and seeks to achieve “antagonistic repoliticization: the claim to reassert democratic political control” (Brubaker 2017, 364). Yet, the
democracy populists seek to reassert differs from the functioning model in most democratic
countries. Populists seek direct democracy or majoritarianism where the will of the majority is
the guiding principle for organizing society. Measures in place to protect minority rights and the
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checks and balances that are essential to liberal democracy are considered hostile elite
constructions which restrict the people’s democratic power. Thus, populists call for “the
replacement of existing intermediate political institutions with more direct forms of
participation” (Bonikowski, 2016, p. 11). For populists, direct democracy is a straightforward
means of organizing society where they see “popular sovereignty [as] the only legitimate source
of political power” (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013, p. 151).
Populists also apply this simplified approach to democracy to their policy plans. Weyland
(2001, p. 14) captured this when he conceptualized populism “as a political strategy through
which a personalistic leader seeks or exercises government power based on the direct,
unmediated, institutionalized support from large numbers of mostly unorganized followers.”
Populists often trim complexities and nuance from issues and brand an over-simplified solution
as understandable, practical, and responsive to the will of the people. Their policy framework is
usually “reductive…rejects nuanced political arguments in favor of moral outrage…encourages
politics based on fear and resentment rather than informed policy debate” (Bonikowski, 2016, p.
22). In addition, populist parties rely on charismatic leaders. This type of leader distinguishes
themselves from the political leaders in power by emphasizing that they are outsiders of the
establishment, they represent the true interests of the people, and more importantly, they are
members of the people. In this way, populist leaders appear to be real alternatives to the elite
political establishment.
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III. Literature Review

Two developments in the most recent decade have captured considerable attention in the
political arena. One is the growing awareness of the urgency of climate change which has led to
calls for climate policies at all levels of governance. Another is the rising tide of populism
around the world. These two phenomena were studied extensively but separately until a few
years ago when scholars began unpacking the connections between populist parties, and their
environmental stances and policies. In this nascent but burgeoning field, several key trends can
be identified in terms of research directions and approaches. The next sections summarize and
review these lines of inquiry from three prevailing directions: 1) descriptive studies on the
relationship between populism and the environment; 2) explanatory studies on the relationship
between populist parties and their anti-environmental tendencies; and 3) new developments in
the field, unpacking the positive correlations between populist parties and certain proenvironmental policies.

1. Descriptive Studies on the Intersection Between Populism and the Environment
One direction in this scholarly field is to investigate negative correlations between
populist parties and environmental attitudes or policy agendas. These studies approach the
subject in one of two ways: individual-level analysis, and party- or policy-level analysis.
The individual-level analysis has been presented by several large-scale quantitative studies on
populist supporters and their attitudes towards the environment. Populist parties and their
supporters are characterized by climate denial, climate skepticism, and opposition to climate
policies. The broadest analysis was conducted by Kulin, Johansson Sevä, and Dunlap (2021) on
23 countries’ 2016 European Social Survey data. Using measures of climate skepticism and voter
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attitudes on increasing fossil fuel taxes as an indicator of attitudes towards climate policies, they
found that those who supported right wing populism (RWP) were more likely to hold
nationalistic ideologies. Such ideologies were also correlated with higher levels of climate
skepticism and opposition to climate policies (ibid.). This general trend supports the results
obtained from a longitudinal analysis in the UK from 2007 to 2016; Batel and Devine-Wright
(2018) found that the rise of RWP and post-truth politics had steered many voters to choose more
conventional fossil-fuel based “independent and competitive energy policies” over renewable
energies, as justified by “right-wing populist post-truth logic” (42).
Huber and his colleagues conducted two studies on this topic, one in the UK and one in
the US, yielding similar results. In the US study, a survey of 3,000 people coupled with
observational and experimental data showed that populist attitudes accentuate existing partisan
cleavages where populist Republicans oppose climate policies more than non-populist
Republicans (R. A. Huber, Fesenfeld, & Bernauer, 2020). In the UK, using the British Election
Study, R. A. Huber (2020) found that the effect of populism acts independently of political
ideologies. Populist supporters generally reject climate and environmental policies based on their
anti-elite attitudes. Lastly, Yan, Schroeder, and Stier (2021) employed a novel mixed method
approach combining survey responses and web browsing histories from respondents in 6
European countries to identify a link between RWP and climate skepticism. Two small-scale
case studies also aligned with this line of research. Kojola (2019) found that Donald Trump’s
populist campaign in the US used populist, nationalistic, and racist rhetoric to mobilize
extractive populism in mining communities. Using data from the Austrian National Election
Study, R. A. Huber, Greussing, and Eberl (2021) unpacked two channels through which
populism encourages climate skepticism within its voter base.
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Another type of analysis focuses on the correlation between populism and antienvironmentalism with broader units of analysis at both the party- and policy-level. The broad
consensus in this line of literature is that populist parties, especially right-leaning ones, oppose
climate policies and treaties; their international and global nature runs contrary to those parties’
nationalist appeals (Forchtner, 2019; Schaller & Carius, 2019; Tosun & Debus, 2021; Vihma,
Reischl, & Nonbo Andersen, 2021). Policy outcomes and political agendas are the main
measurements scholars use to assess populist parties’ political stances on the environment. Two
qualitative studies in this field have used greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (or carbon dioxide
emissions) as indicators of environmental policy outcomes to argue that populist governments
across the EU perform worse in curbing GHG emissions than non-populist governments
(Böhmelt, 2021; Jahn, 2021).
Other studies in this field have used case studies to lay out the extractive resource
policies employed by populist governments across the world. In a 2019 special issue in the
journal Annals of the American Association of Geographers, several studies highlighted the
convergence of extractivism, populism, and authoritarian governance across case studies
(McCarthy, 2019). Lyall and Valdivia (2019) showed how the “petro-populist” government in
Ecuador leveraged the volatile oil market to speculate and extract fossil fuels in order to profit
and remain in power. As mentioned above, the Trump campaign in the U.S. utilized the populist
frame to rally electoral support by feeding into the nationalistic, nostalgic, gendered, and
racialized sentiments of mining communities in the South (Kojola, 2019). Two case studies have
been conducted on populist governments in Asia, in Mongolia (Myadar & Jackson, 2019) and in
the Philippines (Saguin, 2019). Myadar and Jackson (2019) have shown how populist
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governments have skillfully politicized natural resource problems and advanced their own
extractive agendas for gold mining, while Saguin (2019) has done so for fisheries.
This focus on national extractivist populist policies was expanded by another special
issue in the journal Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft in 2021 which focused on
populism in Mexico, Poland, and Brazil. Solorio, Ortega, Romero, and Guzmán (2021) argued
that left-wing inclusive populism under Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador has
prioritized the extraction of natural resources at the expense of indigenous communities whose
values, identities and struggles are anchored in natural conservation. Back to far-right populism
in Brazil, environmental governance once in place has been dismantled by the political tactics
promoting a “total extractivism” under a populist appeal (Menezes & Barbosa Jr, 2021).
Similarly, Poland’s populist Law and Justice (PiS) party has pushed for environmental nativism.
It has conducted a full-blown assault on the structure in place for Poland to transition away from
coal and into renewable energies. This has caused Poland to again become carbon-dependent
(Riedel, 2021). Additionally, Andreucci (2018) has noted the extractive nature of Bolivia’s leftwing populist Morales government. Also, Sedlak (2017) analyzed Canada’s experience under
populist Stephen Harper who rejected treaties on climate change and eviscerated the nation’s
environmental agencies.
This strand of literature has proliferated over the years. Yet several major shortcomings
have emerged, especially in the methodological approaches they have employed. Firstly, despite
the contributions from two special issues, most studies in this field have been Eurocentric, and a
great majority of the quantitative work has been conducted in a European context. Less work has
highlighted cases in Latin America, Asia, and North America, and most has relied on single case
studies. As such, there has been a dearth of comparative studies which cross continental
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boundaries. Secondly, most of the quantitative studies in this field have relied on generalizing a
few statistical measures to correlate populism with either climate performance metrics focused
on fossil fuel policy or GHG emissions, or voter attitudes and beliefs. Or some qualitative
inquiries are narrowed to use single-country case studies. Thus, attention is lacking in the middle
ground between large-scale generalization and detailed specification in terms of sample and
methodological selection.

2. Explanatory Studies on Populism and Anti-environmental Tendencies
A separate and parallel research stream has sought to uncover and account for the
connections between populism and hostility towards environmental actions. Over the past several
years, three major camps of explanations have surfaced—structural, ideological, and strategic.
The cornerstone piece in this field was written by Lockwood (2018) who delineated two general
explanations for RWP’s hostility towards climate agendas. The first explanation is “structural.” It
stems from the populist roots in the economic and political marginalization of their grassroots
supporters who feel left behind “in post-industrial societies through structural change in the
global economy” (ibid, 718). The second explanation, which Lockwood deemed more potent, is
“ideological”; it centers on the “right-wing populism’s anti-elite, socially conservative, and
nationalist values and their aversion to globalism, liberalism, and the loss of national
sovereignty” (Buzogány & Mohamad-Klotzbach, 2021, p. 157; Fraune & Knodt, 2018;
Lockwood, 2018).
Most of the explanations proposed in this literature fall within the ideological camp.
Some scholars have concluded that the ideological cleavage between the political left and right
account for most of RWP’s hostility towards the environment. In a comparative study of two
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right wing populist parties (RWPPs), two leftwing populist parties (LWPP) and two valence
populist parties from Austria, Czechia, Greece, Italy, Poland and Spain, RWPPs were found to
be “more likely to advance post-factual ‘anti-elitist’ discourse”. Meanwhile, “left-wing and leftleaning valence populists rely on populist discourses to demand more ambitious ECP [energy
and climate policy] measures” (R. Huber, Maltby, Szulecki, & Ćetkovic, 2021, pp. 1011-1012).
Similarly, Berker and Pollex (2021) compared parties’ reactions to the environmental movement
Fridays for Future at the sub-national level in Germany. They found a distinct polarization of
their positions along party lines in which the RWPP Alternative for Germany (AfD) was most
opposed to the movement. Regarding the correlation between individual political preferences and
attitudes towards the environment, they also found that RPWW supporters are more likely to be
skeptical towards climate change and opposed to climate actions than those on the left (Yan et
al., 2021).
Even though the left-right political division has proven to be a significant ideological
factor correlated with attitudes towards climate policies, R. A. Huber (2020, p. 959) has argued
that populism should be treated as “independent of political ideology” and that it “offers an
orthogonal dimension to partisanship and left-right self-placement, which broadens the scope of
the concept.” Many studies have done precisely this, building on Lockwood’s ideological
explanation of the RWPP’s hostility towards the environment while treating populism as an
independent factor, exerting considerable influence on parties’ climate policies and attitudes.
Koch and Perreault (2018) have proposed the theoretical framework of resource nationalism
referring to “the multiple ways in which physical and biological environments and resources
become politically understood as inextricably linked to national identities, fortunes, and
prospects” (ibid, 611). To demonstrate its salience, they applied it to cases in Kazakhstan,
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Bolivia, and the U.S. In an array of studies, researchers have named similar unique populismorientated (anti-)climate policy agendas with an array of terms such as resource nationalism and
climate nationalism.
Several papers in the special issue Annals of the American Association of Geographers
(mentioned above) have noted that populist regimes in Latin America and Asia have connected
populism and its nationalistic appeals to justify the extraction of natural resources such as
petroleum in Ecuador (Lyall & Valdivia, 2019), copper and gold in Mongolia (Myadar &
Jackson, 2019), coal mining in the U.S. (Kojola, 2019), and fisheries in the Philippines (Saguin,
2019). Resource nationalism is also an intrinsic characteristic in Latin American politics as
Solorio et al. (2021, p. 249) have stated, “In Latin America, the relationship between populism
and environmentalism is intrinsically linked to extractivism.” In addition to the Ecuador “petropopulism” studied by Lyall and Valdivia (2019), Menezes and Barbosa Jr (2021) have detailed
how Bolsonaro’s populist government in Brazil systematically dismantled existing
environmental governance and opened up natural resources for full exploitation; Andreucci
(2018) and Solorio et al. (2021) dissected how anti-indigeneity and populism go hand-in-hand in
extractivist policies under populist governments in Bolivia and Mexico, respectively. Similar
trends have been found in Europe. Poland’s refusal to transition to renewable energy and its
continuation of carbon-dependency has been explained by the environmental nativist campaign
under the populist party PiS (Riedel, 2021). In quantitative studies, nationalism has also been
found to have strong correlations with anti-environmental attitudes among populist supporters
(Batel & Devine-Wright, 2018; Kulin et al., 2021).
More recently, scholars have proposed a third explanation for the connection between
populism and climate hostility—strategic explanations. They argue that populist environmental
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policy orientations are chosen based on the political opportunity structures available in certain
time windows. Oswald et al. (2021) conducted a comparative study of the French populist party
RN and the German populist party AfD. They argued the “diverging strategies in dealing with
environmental issues and which specific topics to focus on” are “at least partially the result of
political opportunity structure and the nature of populism as a strategy” (ibid, 196). Therefore,
these two populist parties’ environmental policy orientations are “strategically motivated” (ibid,
202), setting themselves apart from the structural and ideological explanations of previous
studies. Similarly, the Austrian populist Freedom Party’s support of an environmental protection
glyphosate ban has been found to be motivated primarily by the electoral opportunity to expand
their voter base (Tosun & Debus, 2021).
Even though the literature has presented various explanations accounting for the
overwhelmingly negative relationship between populism and environmental agendas, there is a
significant analytical step missing in the understanding of connections between populism and
environmental agendas. Few studies have accounted for exactly how populist parties connect
their environmental agendas within their populist framework. As many have followed the line of
ideological explanation on why populist parties’ hostility towards climate change has stemmed
from their central antagonism of “the people v. the corrupt elite” or nationalism, many have
failed to take this step forward to illustrate how it is accomplished. Further, those arguing for
ideological explanations rarely consider other possible policy orientations under populist
regimes, namely, not outright hostility but favorable environmental policy stances. Just like the
novel strategic explanations of populism and environmental stances, some studies have broken
away from the established mainstream focuses and approaches in this field. In the upcoming
section, I review some of these new developments.
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3. New Developments in RWPP’s Support for Pro-environmental Policies
A recent development in the literature has been the identification of RWPP’s support for
certain pro-environmental policies at the national level. RWPP would defend these policies if
they conform with nationalistic or patriotic values. Some scholars have called this new trend
“green patriotism” (Forchtner, 2019; François & Adrien, 2021). In a case study of three Nordic
populist parties—the Danish People’s Party (DF), the Finns Party (PS), and the Sweden
Democrats (SD)—researchers found that their climate stances were “not set in stone”, but more
nuanced and subject to change (Vihma et al., 2021). For example, the DF was initially alienated
from many voters because of its climate denialism. This later prompted it to “move away from
vaguely denialist rhetoric and to initiate a more progressive position than most European populist
parties” (ibid, 231). The PS and SD have embraced climate policies yet endeavor to separate
themselves from established parties by challenging “political correctness” in the context of
climate change, and advocating for climate policies from their own nationalistic standpoints
(ibid, 232). Ćetković and Hagemann (2020) have studied populist parties’ policy influences
regarding GHG and energy policies in six Western European countries over the past decade.
They found mixed results in policy outcomes as well. Although populist-controlled ministries are
usually connected with low environmental performance, they indirectly contribute to the lowcarbon transition by polarizing the political arena and opening space for smaller, more
progressive parties. Similar nuance has been found in both RN in France and PiS in Poland
which have been virulently opposed to wind power while being supportive of small-scale
renewable projects (Szulecki & Ancygier, 2015; Timperley, 2017). Gemenis, Katsanidou, and
Vasilopoulou (2012) also found that against the background of populist parties’ hostility to
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environmental policies, the Austrian Freedom Party, Danish People’s Party and Hungary’s
populist Jobbik movement have all appeared to be supportive of renewable energy.
There have been many exciting developments in this literature on the intersection
between populism and the environment. Yet, they still have several limitations: 1)
geographically, they concentrate on populist parties in Europe; 2) with regards to party families,
they focus on (radical) right-wing populist parties; 3) methodologically, they use either largesample quantitative analysis or single case studies; and 4) directionally, they highlight populist
parties’ connections to climate denial, skepticism, and hostile climate policies over positive
connections; 5) in terms of purpose, they focus either exclusively on establishing statistical
correlations or proposing explanations.
Thus, I situate this thesis within the nexus of these research gaps in the literature on the
connection between populism and the environment. In order to take the initial step to address
these research limitations, I deploy a comparative analysis of four populist parties (addressing
#3) across Europe, North and South America (addressing #1) from different party families
(addressing #2) to unpack how their pro-environmental and anti-environmental (addressing #4)
agendas are anchored in key elements of their populist rhetoric (addressing #5).
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IV. Methodology
Given the objective of showing populist parties’ anchor of their environmental agendas in
core populist elements, I have chosen four populist parties as case studies. These four case
studies cross the axis of variation on two fronts: party family (right-wing or left-wing) and
positions of environmental agendas (pro-environment or anti-environment). I have chosen one
case study per combination of the two characteristics (see Table 1). They cover Europe, North
America, and South America. These variations are designed to demonstrate the consistency of
populist parties’ framing of environmental agendas across the spectrum.

Right-wing

Left-wing

Anti-environment

Pro-environment

Republican Party under Donald Trump,

National Rally under Marine Le Pen,

USA

France

Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro’s

Podemos under Pablo Iglesias, Spain

regime in Venezuela
Table 1. Case Study Selection and Operationalization

Populist parties chosen along party lines are the ones which appear clear and consistent as to
which side of the political spectrum they reside upon. On stances of populist parties’
environmental agendas, they pertain to a broad constellation of possibilities of a party’s
environmental rhetoric, stances, and policymaking. They can be related to an array of issues such
as the use, exploitation or preservation of natural resources (e.g. fossil fuels, underground
minerals), air and water pollution, energy generation, land use, biodiversity, or international
climate treaties. Pro-environment parties are identified as parties with favorable environmental
agendas that support a range of environmental and conservation measures, in practice,
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rhetorically, or both. Pro-environment indicators include support for renewable energy,
international climate treaties, and resource conservation. Conversely, I identify anti-environment
parties as parties with adverse environmental agendas that reject environmental or conservation
measures either in practice, rhetorically, or both. These parties tend to support measures like
resource extraction, deregulation of the environment, and continued reliance on fossil fuels
Following Odell’s (2003) recommendation, I have chosen the cases based on their match
with the key operationalizations I employ, and based on which provides the most analytical
value. I chose these cases because each has clearly identifiable environmental agendas that fall
into either one of the two categories (pro-environment or anti-environment). Moreover, each is
clearly identifiable as a left- or right-wing party. Each party I have chosen also has strong
political prowess in its respective country’s political sphere which ensures the relevance,
significance, and validity of the case studies. This does not necessarily require the populist party
to be in power. Rather, their prowess can be shown in a variety of ways such as general electoral
support, participation in major government coalitions, seats taken in parliament, key offices
occupied by party members, and influences, disruption, or shock to the domestic political sphere.
I introduce each populist party at the beginning of its respective chapter.
For this, I use qualitative content analysis to unpack the discursive logic behind populist
parties’ environmental agendas. I choose texts to analyze that are pertinent and revealing of
populist parties’ rhetoric surrounding their environmental agendas. To do this, I analyze audio
and visual sources in the form of transcribed texts with occasional references to their visual
forms which appear particularly relevant to their rhetoric. This selection is intended to be neither
comprehensive nor random, but to be most relevant and revealing about the ways by which
populist parties employ discursive logic on environmental issues and policies. I use NVivo to
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assist with inductive coding of all data and perform at least two rounds of coding to cross-check
the coding keys’ validity.
The main unit of analysis is the populist party. In this thesis, I investigate how populist
parties frame their environmental agendas on key areas such as climate change, renewable
energy, natural resource extraction and global climate treaties. All data are drawn from primary
sources directly published by or related to populist parties in question such as official party
platforms, public statements, press releases, party leaders’ and key members’ speeches and
interviews, as well as secondary sources such as news reports and academic articles. Primary
data from non-English speaking countries are either obtained as translated English texts from the
data source or are cross-translated by translation software (Google Translate and DeepL). There
is considerable variation in terms of the type, quantity, and richness of the data available for each
case study. Therefore, I highlight detailed data sources drawn for each case study in their
respective chapters.
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V. Right-wing, Anti-environment Party: GOP under Donald Trump in United States
The first of the four case studies starts with an analysis of a right-wing populist party’s
anti-environmental agendas. I turn to the U.S. Republican Party (GOP) during Donald Trump’s
2016~2020 presidency. Among all four case studies, this case covers the shortest time period, yet
it has the broadest anti-environmental agendas anchored in the most diverse set of populist
rhetoric.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of Trump-style populism and his antienvironmental agendas. Then, four sections are introduced and later expanded. The first section
focuses on an outlier of Trump’s pro-environmental rhetoric along populist lines while the
subsequent three sections each dives into a distinctive populist feature of his broad antienvironmental agendas.

Overview: Donald Trump, Populism, and Ant-environmental Agendas
In the United States, Donald Trump’s right-wing, populist administration broke away
from and undermined a wide range of political norms and values that took decades to take root in
the U.S. Trump led the tide of furious backlash against multiculturalism, racial and gender
equality, LGBTQIA+ rights, immigration, good-will foreign relations, etc. Consistent with
GOP’s anti-environmental and neo-liberal history, as well as Trump’s appeal to a voter base who
felt left behind by their government and abandoned by globalization, Trump’s administration
waged a war on the environment during his four years in office. He rolled back over 100 pieces
of major environmental rules governing a wide range of issues such as toxic chemicals and
pollution, natural resource extraction, clean water and air, biodiversity, and global climate
actions (Popovich, Albeck-Ripka, & Peierre-Louis, 2021).
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The Trump administration’s attack on the environment was simple and direct. It aimed to
reverse any piece of pro-environmental regulation within reach and to open up as many natural
resources for extraction as possible. Almost like a reincarnation of the white, Manifest Destiny
“trailblazers,” Trump enacted policies that swept across land, water, and natural resources from
indigenous and marginalized communities, destroyed well-protected ecosystems, left debris and
harm that would take decades to be cleaned up (if possible). All these were done in the name of
building a strong nation for the American people who ironically only pertain to a very narrow
group of Americans.
Examining closely, these seemingly straightforward anti-environmental agendas pushed
by the Trump administration were actually anchored in a multi-faceted populist rhetoric. Three
distinctively populist elements underpinned Trump’s anti-environmental agendas. These
elements are: (1). People-centricity, appealing to the people with job security, dignity, and
prosperity by building a de-regulated, American-first, energy-intensive economy; (2). Antielitism justifying the reversal of Washington elites’ self-interested pro-environmental legislations
in order to represent the real interests of the American people; and (3). Resource nationalism and
energy sovereignty coupled with hostility towards foreign powers to assert America’s global
dominance based on the “America First” principle.
Three upcoming sections highlight each of these three populist elements anchoring
Trump’s anti-environmental agendas respectively. Every section begins with a general overview
of the populist element and then—with the aid of two sub-sections each—dives into how the
populist element connects to and anchors Trump’s diverse set of anti-environmental policies and
rhetoric in more detail.
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To this above, one section needs to be added first, giving attention to what might seem
like a conceptual outlier: some of Trump’s occasional pro-environmental expressions. They are,
still, rooted in the same populist rhetoric, articulating immense nationalistic pride in the great
American nature, and the obligation to preserve it for the American people.
The following sections draw evidence from official statements, announcements,
speeches, Twitter posts and legislation by Trump himself, key officials, and offices under his
administration. We begin with an outlier case of Trump’s pro-environmental gestures and then
move to three sections on the core populist features of his anti-environmental agendas.

The Outlier: Preserving the Great American Nature for American People
Prior to analyzing the general anti-environmental policies and rhetoric of Trump’s
administration, this section begins by recognizing a superficial yet crucial pro-environmental
aspect within his rhetorical approaches to the environment. These were occasional expressions of
great appreciation for and pride in the American natural beauty, landscape, and abundant natural
resources. They often come hand-in-hand with expressions of obligations to preserve nature for
the American people. In these instances, Trump concealed his usual hostile anti-environmental
agendas with a veneer of positivity and appreciation. Although their appearances seemed to be
very context-specific and at odds with his general anti-environmental rhetoric, these positive
framing of the environment were, just like Trump’s anti-environmental agendas, important in
showing Trump’s consistent utilization of populist anchors for his environmental rhetoric.
The Land Conversation Bill was one of few legislations passed with bipartisan support
under Trump that remotely resembled the idea of environmental protection. When Trump
announced the bill, he stated that it was “the passage of truly landmark legislation that will
36

preserve America’s majestic natural wonders, priceless historic treasures…these exquisite
resources is the most glorious heritage a people have ever received” (Associated Press, 2020).
This characterization of America’s natural environment screamed nationalistic pride, particularly
in America’s abundant natural resources.
Similar language and expressions of national pride can be found in Trump’s annual Earth
Day statements where he repeatedly referred back to the same idea of the proud and unique
heritage of the American natural beauty. In each year’s statement, Trump always went back to
similar points on the unique gift of American nature: “Americans are rightly grateful for these
God-given gifts” (Donald J. Trump, 2017m); “The blessings given to us by our Creator. Among
them, we cherish our magnificent land and waterways, abundant natural resources, and unique
wildlife” (Donald J. Trump, 2018c); “From the Appalachian Mountains to the golden shores of
California, America is blessed with some of the most beautiful scenery on Earth. As Americans,
we all share an immense pride in these God-given treasures and a tremendous appreciation for
our abundance of natural resources” (Donald J. Trump, 2019a); and “The United States is
blessed with breathtaking and plentiful natural wonders and resources, providing recreation and
sustenance to millions throughout our country” (Donald J. Trump, 2020a). These show that
Trump held immense pride in America’s natural resources and majestic beauty. Such pride was
often expressed in a populistic and nationalistic fashion where he never pointed to any single site
of natural wonder without putting it in the context of the American nation and the American
people.
His pro-environmental remarks were embedded in strong populist sentiments through
multiple references to preserving the natural beauty for the American people and their future
generations. The American nature under the Trump administration was, above all, for
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Americans’ enjoyment and leisure. This theme was present in all four of his Earth Day
statements: “Americans are rightly grateful for these God-given gifts and have an obligation to
safeguard them for future generations” (Donald J. Trump, 2017m); “As a nation, it is our duty to
recognize the importance of these life-sustaining gifts, and it is our responsibility to protect them
for our own benefit and that of generations to come…preserving the blessings of the land for
future generations” (Donald J. Trump, 2018c); “We reaffirm our responsibility to protect God's
wondrous creation for future generations” (Donald J. Trump, 2019a); “We reaffirm our
commitment to protecting our natural treasures for the benefit and enjoyment of all
Americans…We pledge to continue doing our part to ensure that Americans are able to enjoy the
natural splendor of our beautiful Nation now and for generations to come” (Donald J. Trump,
2020a).
These statements invoked the most inclusive depiction of the people in Trump’s populist
rhetoric, laying minimal boundaries around this identity. In this case, anyone who benefits from
the American nature was included as the people and he appealed to them through the classic
environmental rhetoric on the preservation of nature for future generations. And Trump himself
was glorified as the great populist leader on a mission to conserve nature for them all.
Nevertheless, if one was to place these “environmentally friendly” and conservationoriented gestures in the repertoire of the Trump administration’s environmental agendas, they
immediately stand out as outliers. They were necessary concessions Trump made for political
expediency at times where his traditional hostility towards the environment would be deemed
unacceptable, such as on Earth Day. His half-heartedness and contempt for conservation lurked
under the surface. For example, in his statement for the Land Conversation Bill, he bungled the
pronunciation of the Yosemite National Park—one of, if not the most famous national park in the
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U.S.—as “yo Semites." He also exploited this opportunity to exclude Democrats from the billsigning ceremony so that he could claim all credits to himself and his fellow Republicans
(Associated Press, 2020; Karni, 2020).
Despite his occasional expression of wonder and pride in America’s unique natural
beauty, abundant resources, and the idea of conservation for future generations, the
overwhelming majority of his environmental agendas on energy and natural resources resembled
one of extraction rather than conservation. His take on natural resources was reminiscent of
Gifford Pinchot’s 19th century “imperial ecology” (Pinchot, 2012) which has long been criticized
and rendered obsolete in the environmental field. More importantly, it was shown consistently
throughout his career that nature was treated primarily as mere raw materials for America to
transfer into economic prosperity and global dominance. This weaves deeply into Trump’s
populist framing of the environment with a heavy focus on expanding energy jobs and extraction
of natural resources on American soil which are discussed in later sections.
What’s important here, however, is the veneer of positivity that Trump had shown
towards the environment and conservation that doesn’t necessarily contradict the populist nature
of his environmental agendas. On the contrary, they are powerful examples of how consistent
Trump was at anchoring his environmental rhetoric in populist elements such as national pride
and appeals to the people, even in pro-environmental gestures that he invested very little in.

1. Environment for the People: Bringing Back American Jobs and Way of Life
It is no secret that Donald Trump, with his populist rhetoric, repeatedly constructed
various representations of the people based on sets of very carefully chosen identities designed
for different contexts. The people can refer to American citizens when talking about anti39

immigration, working-class Americans when denouncing big businesses and Washington elites,
and white Americans when pushing back against BLM movements. In each case, he proved that
“the people [in populist rhetoric] could be constructed with ethnic or political criteria, as a plural
population or as a unitary actor” (Laclau, 2005b, p. 48).
When it comes to Trump’s populist anti-environmental agendas, the people entailed a
few carefully crafted identities in very specific contexts. He primarily appealed to two identities
of the people, both closely associated with the economy: average Americans who deserve decent
jobs and decent living standards under a strong American economy, and coal miners whose
traditional way of living was taken away by pro-environmental policies and globalization.

1.1 Environmental jobs for hardworking Americans
Trump unleashed an untiring populist crusade to dismantle any piece of proenvironmental legislation in order to open up the environment for economic development by
private sectors. This agenda was firmly grounded in his populist appeal to the people who desire
secure jobs in a strong American economy.
Secure jobs was one of the cornerstones in Trump’s vision to “Make America Great
Again” and his promises “made to American people during my campaign for President… cutting
job-killing regulation…bringing jobs, plants, and factories back into the United States at
numbers which no one until this point thought even possible” (Donald J. Trump, 2017e). His
antienvironmental agendas were an extension of this logic. Jobs became almost synonymous
with the people. A desirable life for an average American always comes from a secure job that
brings stability, dignity, and prosperity to their (most of the time, referring to his) family. To
achieve this, Trump’s environmental plans stripped industries of regulatory “burdens,” loosened
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environmental standards, opened up land, water, and natural resources for development and job
opportunities.
All of these actions were justified on the populist ground, responding to the needs of the
American people who share the frustrations of losing old jobs and dignity to globalization and
energy transition, and who longed for job security, prosperity, and pride by working for great
American businesses that run on American resources. Trump’s populist rhetoric skillfully
connected this carefully delineated set of identities, frustrations, and desires of the American
people with his anti-environmental agendas.
One of the key steps the Trump administration took to dismantle environmental
protections was to pull the U.S. out of the Obama administration’s major international climate
accord, the Paris Agreement. He justified this bold move by appealing to the American people
who were painted as victims of international treaties and environmental regulations. 2 Trump
incessantly labeled the Paris Agreement as a “job-killing” “bad deal” for the average Americans
in statements, speeches, and rallies (Donald J. Trump, 2017e, 2017g, 2017h, 2017i, 2017j,
2019d), feeding into the frustration and rage in the crowds. To add credibility to his claims, he
cited statistics, “Compliance…could cost America as much as 2.7 million lost jobs by 2025
according to the National Economic Research Associates” and “According to this same study, by
2040…The cost to the economy at this time would be close to $3 trillion in lost GDP and 6½
million industrial jobs, while households would have $7,000 less income and, in many cases,
much worse than that” (ibid.).
Trump’s decision to sever ties with the Paris Agreement boosted his image as the leader
of the people who sees their grievances and acts for their interests. Trump could not let an

2

The nationalistic aspect of this will be discussed in later sections.
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international agreement “undermine our economy, hamstring our workers” (Donald J. Trump,
2017e). He promised, “As President, I can put no other consideration before the well-being of
American citizens…The Paris climate accord is…leaving American workers—who I love—and
taxpayers to absorb the cost in terms of lost jobs, lower wages, shuttered factories, and vastly
diminished economic production” (Donald J. Trump, 2017e). It became clear that Trump’s
decision to disengage with the Paris Agreement was less directed toward any specific content of
the agreement but stemmed from the populist idea that any deal that risked jeopardizing the
American people’s interests is a bad deal. Thus, as the true representative of the people, Trump
was more than justified to bail out of this international agreement.
This preoccupation with sustaining American jobs was not just evident in Trump’s
rhetoric justifying withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, but in various actions he took to
deregulate formerly protected natural resources. During each year’s National Energy Awareness
Month, Trump’s remarks always had a centerpiece along the lines of “unleashing our Nation’s
energy potential to drive robust job growth and expansion in every sector of our economy”
(Donald J. Trump, 2017d, 2018b, 2019b, 2020c). When Trump challenged 14 states, led by
California, that set more stringent tailpipe pollution standards than the federal government, he
rallied auto workers by arguing that the federal deregulation would lead to “many more cars will
be produced under the new and uniform standard, meaning significantly more JOBS, JOBS,
JOBS!” (realdonaldtrump, 2019). Trump unilaterally weakened the National Environmental
Policy Act, limiting public review of federal infrastructure projects to expedite permit approval
processes for freeways, power plants, and pipelines, etc. This infrastructural project was framed
as a piece long overdue for the American people which will “strengthen our economic
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platform…create millions of jobs, increase wages for American workers, and reduce the costs of
goods and services for American families and consumers” (Donald J. Trump, 2017k).

1.2 Coal miners: get your lives back
Workers in the energy sectors, especially the shrinking coal mining communities, formed
and sustained strong electoral support for Trump throughout his political career, reciprocating his
relentless populist campaign for their nostalgia for their old ways of life. Returning jobs to
energy workers was a central part of his campaign rhetoric as he said at a Nashville Rally,
“We're going to put our miners back to work. We're going to put our auto industry back to work.
Already, because of this new business climate, we are creating jobs that are starting to pour back
into our country like we haven't seen in many, many decades” (Donald J. Trump, 2017h).
In the coal community, Trump was very successful at creating and appealing to coal
miners’ “heartland,” a uniquely populist term that “represents an idealized conception of the
community they serve. It is from this territory of the imagination, that populists construct the
‘people’ as the object of their politics” (Taggart, 2004, p. 274). For coal miners, such “heartland”
evoked by Trump was something they’ve lost and longed for in the past decades when their
livelihoods, communal life, and shared identity dissipated under strict environmental regulation
over coal mining. Reversing previous federal restrictions on coal—what Trump referred to as the
“War on Coal”—was a key component of Trump’s anti-environmental agendas since the
beginning. His spokesman responded to journalists in 2017 regarding this matter, saying,
“Absolutely, I think he made a pledge to the coal industry, and he's going to do whatever he can
to help those workers” (Brady, 2017a).

43

In one of his speeches at a conservative conference in 2017, Trump claimed to protect
coal miners by unfolding his larger plans to open up all kinds of natural resources for
exploitation. He said, “We're preparing bold action to lift the restrictions on American energy,
including shale, oil, natural gas, and beautiful clean coal, and we're going to put our miners back
to work. Miners are going back to work. Miners are going back to work, folks. Sorry to tell you
that, but they're going back to work” (Donald J. Trump, 2017k). Trump did not hide the supports
that coal miners reciprocated to him either, as he said, “I had people in my office—I had miners,
and I had farmers, and I had builders building homes. And many of them were tough, strong men
and women. And almost all of them were crying. They said, ‘Sir, you've given our life back to
us’” (Donald J. Trump, 2019c). Coal miners’ gratitude towards Trump’s anti-environmental
agendas further boosted his legitimacy as the populist leader who would go to great lengths to
safeguard his constituencies’ ways of life.
This successful mobilization of coal miners through the populist anti-environmental
agendas was also captured by Kojola (2019, p. 371) when he argued that “nostalgia for
preserving mining as a way of life and anger at outsiders disrupting their livelihoods and
extractive moral economy.” The “environmental imaginaries and the social meanings of land,
labor, and natural resources” (Kojola, 2019, p. 378) in the mining community were exploited by
Trump. He promised these mining communities that they will have their old jobs back and
reclaim their “heartland.” As Kojola observed, such populist rhetoric in Trump’s antienvironmental agendas did not just rely on the appeal to the people, it had deep connections with
his populist nationalistic and anti-elite appeals as well. The next sections explore these two
populist anchors for Trump’s anti-environmental agendas in more detail.
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2. Out with Obama: Demolishing Washington Elites’ Pro-environmental Legacies
On one hand, Trump’s anti-environmental agendas appealed to the pure and hardworking
American people by promising job opportunity and their old ways of living. On the other hand,
he attributed the abandonment and betrayal felt by these ordinary Americans to the corrupt elites’
pro-environmental legislations. Trump brandished his populist rhetoric to declare that he has
devoted his anti-environmental agendas to battle the selfish elites for the interests of the ordinary
people.
Legislations dismantling Obama-era environmental policies and deregulating the
environment were justified by Trump’s populism. Previous legislations were portrayed as
attempts by Washington elites, bureaucrats, and their special interests to amass power and wealth
through excessive regulations at the expense of the people. They were defamed as the culprits of
the average Americans’ plights whose jobs and old ways of life were sacrificed under the
stringent environmental regulations. Trump’s core populist rhetoric anchoring his antienvironmental agendas was brilliantly summarized by his 2016 Wall Street Journal opinion
piece:
“I, for one, am not interested in defending a system that for decades has served the
interest of political parties at the expense of the people. Members of the club—the
consultants, the pollsters, the politicians, the pundits, and the special interests—grow
rich and powerful while the American people grow poorer and more isolated. The only
antidote to decades of ruinous rule by a small handful of elites is a bold infusion of
popular will. On every major issue affecting this country, the people are right and the
governing elite are wrong. The elites are wrong on taxes, on the size of government, on
trade, on immigration, on foreign policy. What we are seeing now is not a proper use of
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the rules, but a flagrant abuse of the rules. Delegates are supposed to reflect the
decisions of voters, but the system is being rigged by party operatives with ‘double-agent’
delegates who reject the decision of voters” (Donald J. Trump, 2016).

This paragraph has all the central anti-elite elements of the populist rhetoric that Trump later
employed to frame his anti-environmental agendas: a small group of corrupt elites in power,
elites’ self-interested and failed policies, the political system rigged by Washington insiders, the
elites’ betrayal of average Americans, and Trump himself as an outsider breaking into the system
to set records straight. The following two sub-sections unpack how Trump maneuvered these
elements to frame and justify his repertoire of anti-environmental policies as an anti-elite
outsider elected to represent the average Americans against the self-interested Washington elites
who’s been running the show for too long.

2.1 The corrupt elites in the Obama administration
Many see Trump’s entire campaign as a backlash against Obama and what he stood for.
And Trump himself certainly did not shy away from branding his administration as the polar
opposite of Obama’s, especially when it came down to their environmental agendas. It has
become clear that Trump was obsessed with “dismantle[ing] the Obama Administration’s
climate change policies” (Carlson, 2017) with his entire populist rhetorical arsenal.
The Trump administration took every opportunity to roll back environmental policies and
to deregulate natural resources, especially those on fossil fuel, put under protection by Obama
and previous administrations. For example, Trump pulled out of the Paris Agreement, one of the
most significant global climate treaties of the past decades, under Obama’s leadership (Friedman,
2019b; Donald J. Trump, 2017e); the Obama-era control on methane, a significantly more potent
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greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide, was lifted (Davenport, 2020); various restrictions on coal,
one of the dirtiest sources of energy, including that on mining and operation of coal plants were
loosened or taken away (Friedman, 2019a) via the replacement of Obama’s signature Clean
Power Plan with a much weaker Affordable Clean Energy Rule (Irfan, 2019). Trump
significantly curtailed previously established environmental review process for infrastructural
projects, many of which could be highly environmentally impactful such as pipelines, drilling,
and mining projects (Reuters, 2020; Donald J. Trump, 2017a, 2017b). Furthermore, he rolled
back the long-standing legislative commitments to clean air and clean water continued by all
presidents since the 1970s were rolled back by Trump (Davenport, 2018; Friedman &
Davenport, 2019).
Trump challenged the Obama administration with his populist rhetoric to discredit,
defame, and vilify them as the elites who trade in what the people really want for the benefit of
their co-conspiring elites. James Brady (2017a), the White House Press Secretary under Trump,
made it clear in 2017 that “we're not going to do some of the crazy stuff the previous
administration did” in terms of climate policies. Trump’s Secretary of Energy, James Richard
Perry (2017) set a similar tone in a cabinet meeting saying, “We're not going to be held hostage
to some Executive order that was ill-thought-out.”
After officials set the stage for framing the Obama administration’s pro-environmental
rule as “crazy” and “ill-thought-out” (Brady, 2017b; Perry, 2017), Trump unleashed an all-front
populist war on the environmental policies enacted by Obama and his “elite friends”. Of course,
the first blow went to the Paris Agreement, depicted as “simply the latest example of
Washington entering into an agreement that disadvantages the United States” (Donald J. Trump,
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2017e). Immediately following that, Trump delivered an even stronger wave of attacks on
Obama’s legacies at the national front.
The Obama-led elites were believed to have colluded with foreign powers to undermine
American people’s interests and to have “waged a relentless war on American energy…They
sought to punish our workers, our producers, and manufacturers with ineffective global
agreements” (Donald J. Trump, 2019e). Revoking Waters of the United States Rule, Trump
branded himself as the protector of personal freedom and individual rights. He put out a
statement claiming that “no longer will Federal bureaucrats be allowed to micromanage every
public pond and drainage ditch on private land. They've taken away your rights. They took away
your—they took away your heart” (Donald J. Trump, 2019c).
In specific state-centered cases, such as shrinking two of Utah’s national monuments,
Trump emphasized the pervasiveness of the infringement on people’s rights by the Washington
elites even at the state level. He warned, “the natural resources of Utah should not be controlled
by a small handful of very distant bureaucrats located in Washington” (Turkewitz, 2017). The
Republican Senator of Utah, Mike Lee echoed this populist rhetoric by defending Trump’s image
as the president of the Utah people and as someone who is “sympathetic to the fact that we’ve
been mistreated…and I’m grateful that he is willing to correct it” (Turkewitz, 2017).
When it came to large-scale infrastructures, previous regulations mandated stringent
environmental assessments to regulate projects that could pose serious harm to the environment
and local ecology. Yet, Trump labeled these rules as unnecessary and a hindrance to the growth
of national energy infrastructure as he said, “For decades, special interest groups, bureaucrats,
and radical environmental activists stymied the maintenance, repair, growth, and expansion of
our Nation's energy infrastructure, preventing us from achieving energy independence” (Donald
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J. Trump, 2020c). Trump added, “The single biggest obstacle to building a modern transportation
system has been mountains and mountains of bureaucratic red tape in Washington
DC…Together we are reclaiming America’s proud heritage of a nation of builders and a nation
that can get things done” (Reuters, 2020). The elites were portrayed as obstacles to the very heart
of American nation-building. This stance on infrastructures reinforced Trump’s populist appeal
as a leader who could correct elites’ wrongdoings that had alienated the people and endangered
national interests.

2.2 Taking your lives back from the elites
Trump was proven to be a successful populist by his ability to stack elements of his
populist discourse on top of each other to create an interlocking and coherent populist rhetoric.
This interconnectivity between elements of his populist rhetoric was made very explicitly in his
attacks on pro-environmental elites. Trump did not defame the elites in isolation, rather he
consistently tried to frame their pro-environmental agendas in direct conflict with the interests of
ordinary American people.
As shown in previous sections, secure jobs and a strong economy were crucial to
Trump’s populist appeal to the people. When Trump was characterizing the failure and damage
done by the Washington elites and the Obama administration’s pro-environmental legislations,
jobs and the economy had taken a center stage too. In this way, Trump buttressed his own image
as the true representative of the people to undo damages imposed on the people by elites and to
deliver what the people really want, jobs and a decent life. “The last administration had stifled
this industry with one costly job-killing regulation after another” (Donald J. Trump, 2020a) well
summarized Trump’s rhetoric on this front.
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Trump was particularly fixated on the energy sector, a foundational piece in his
deregulatory policies. He justified his actions by saying that “the previous administration waged
a relentless war on American energy…These radical plans would not make the world cleaner;
they would just make and put Americans out of work, and they put them out of work rapidly”
(Donald J. Trump, 2019f). The loss of energy jobs, especially for coal miners, was depicted as
the result of the “relentless assault from the previous administration…More than a third of all of
the coal mining jobs had vanished” (Donald J. Trump, 2019c). Moreover, such assault was also a
direct consequence of “federal regulations and bureaucrats [who] were working around the
clock” to obstruct coal leases, drilling, mining, and energy infrastructure projects (ibid.).
Trump was not afraid to bring fire to specific states either. He particularly used this
populist rhetoric to appeal to his supporters in Pennsylvania where he accused the last
administration of killing its coal and fracking industry, the source of nostalgia and pride in its
rural communities. He alluded to miners’ lost way of life to manufacturing jobs under proenvironmental regulations by saying that “I don't know what the hell you're going to do. You
don't want to make widgets, right?” (Donald J. Trump, 2019c).
In addition to the heavy emphasis on jobs, another way through which Trump showed his
advocacy for the average Americans against the elites was to build a strong economy that had
been prevented to grow by pro-environmental regulations. He loved quoting numbers, especially
the economic costs of previous legislations to prove that his plans are superior and more
beneficial for the people. For example, he claimed that Obama’s Clean Power Plan “would have
cost Americans nearly $40 billion a year and caused electricity prices to soar to double digits,
while cutting coal production by almost 250 million tons” (ibid.) if he didn’t step up on behalf of
the people to shut it down.
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Trump did not miss any chance to attack the Paris Agreement, and economic numbers
gave him ample support to do so as he quoted in the official statement for Paris Agreement
withdrawal:
“Compliance with the terms of the Paris…could cost America as much as 2.7 million lost
jobs by 2025 according to the National Economic Research Associates. According to this
same study, by 2040, compliance with the commitments put into place by the previous
administration would cut production for the following sectors: paper, down 12 percent;
cement, down 23 percent; iron and steel, down 38 percent; coal—and I happen to love
the coal miners—down 86 percent; natural gas, down 31 percent. The cost to the
economy at this time would be close to $3 trillion in lost GDP and 6½ million industrial
jobs, while households would have $7,000 less income and, in many cases, much worse
than that” (Donald J. Trump, 2017e).
The Democrats were a frequent subject of Trump’s attacks. He painted them as a party ran by the
elites and out of touch with the people. He was particularly fond of attacking their Green New
Deal proposal. Here again, he cited economic numbers and predicted job losses to back his
claims, “Their plan is estimated to cost our economy nearly $100 trillion, a number
unthinkable…kill millions of jobs; it will crush the dreams of the poorest Americans and
disproportionately harm minority communities…we will defend American sovereignty,
American prosperity, and we will defend American jobs” (Donald J. Trump, 2019e). Not
surprisingly, this partisan attack circled back to the Democratic support for Paris Agreement
where “two hundred and twenty-eight House Democrats voted to put America back into the
disastrous Paris climate accord. How's that working out for Paris? How's that one working out
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for France? The yellow vests. They didn't like [it]…it hasn't been working out well” (Donald J.
Trump, 2019b).
In addition, Trump did refer to the Yellow Vest movement in France that protested against
Macron’s policy to raise fuel tax for conservation. This movement was openly backed by his
French right-wing populist counterpart National Rally. In this instance, it was clear that Trump
could bring a range of evidence to support his populist anti-environmental agendas as long as
they prove his point that the people’s interests have been ignored and sacrificed for the
Washington elites’ self-interested pro-environmental legislations.

3. “America First”: Energy Independence and Global Leadership
The final populist anchor of Trump’s environmental agendas was in line with his
vigorous branding of American nationalism, captured by his slogan “Make America Great
Again.” Trump had adopted numerous hostile foreign policies and restricted immigration of all
sorts. His right-wing nationalistic “America First” doctrine was one of the guiding principles for
his foreign policymaking. Trump made no exceptions in his nationalistic campaign to govern
strictly within the national borders even for the environment, a universally recognized global
issue.
Trump withdrew from many international environmental agreements and partnerships,
among which included the Paris Agreement which has been discussed at length in previous
sections. Rhetorically, Trump seized every opportunity to blame environmental problems on
other countries, especially the emerging power of China and leading powers in Europe, while
glorifying the great American environment. His administration rolled back a series of
environmental protections to open up the energy reservoir, especially that of fossil fuel within
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the U.S. as a backbone for his pursuit of energy sovereignty. All these actions were anchored in
the nationalistic populist rhetoric of energy sovereignty, resource nationalism, and pride in
America’s great environment and its global leadership.

3.1 “America First”: the paramount energy sovereignty
Centered on his nationalistic and populist principle of “America First,” one of Trump’s
major goals on the environmental front was to pursue energy sovereignty. Energy sovereignty
was also identified as a key dimension of resource nationalism commonly found in populist
parties’ anti-environmental agendas (e.g. Andreucci, 2018; Koch & Perreault, 2018; Lyall &
Valdivia, 2019). Energy sovereignty is an umbrella term pertaining to two elements of Trump’s
populist anti-environmental agendas, including a secure national frontier/border, and energy
independence secured by access to the rich reservoir of natural resources on American soil.
The rhetoric on securing the American frontier was evident in Trump’s framings around
the state’s oceanic frontier. In his annual remarks for the Ocean Awareness Month, themes of
national security, safeguarding resources, economic independence and competitiveness were
stressed repeatedly in ways like “We must recognize the importance of our offshore areas to our
security and economic independence, all while protecting the marine environment for present
and future generations” (Donald J. Trump, 2017c); “By exploring, developing, and conserving
the ocean resources of our great Nation, we will augment our economic competitiveness,
enhance our national security, and ensure American prosperity” (Donald J. Trump, 2018a); “Our
ocean and coastal waterways are essential to our national security… global competitiveness, and
transportation…have the potential to promote economic prosperity, create jobs, and strengthen
our maritime and homeland security for current and future generations of Americans” (Donald J.
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Trump, 2020b). The ocean, as the outermost border of the U.S., was given a symbolic role in
Trump’s environmental rhetoric as an important frontier to his overall goal of national security,
energy sovereignty, and global competitiveness.
The expansion of resource extraction enabled by Trump’s deregulation policies was at the
core of U.S. energy sovereign and self-sufficiency. One major action taken by the Trump
administration on this front was opening up oil exploration in previously protected areas. One of
these areas was the Alaska refuge’s coastal plain along the Beaufort Sea. It was believed to
contain the largest untapped onshore oil reserve in North America (Fountain & Eder, 2018). The
administration’s Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary Casey Hammond supported this action,
saying that it “is a significant achievement in delivering on our commitment to provide energy
for America, from America” (BLM Alaska, 2021). It was consistent with the Press Secretary’s
earlier comment about energy policies that aimed at “keeping with President Trump's desire to
make the United States energy independent” (Brady, 2017a).
Partnership with fossil fuel companies was critical to Trump’s vision of energy
sovereignty. On this matter, Trump personally addressed Shell Pennsylvania Chemicals Plant,
praising their efforts in expanding natural gas fracking to provide a stable supply of gasgenerated electricity to American households as opposed to wind farms that “destroy
everybody's property values, kill all the birds” (Donald J. Trump, 2019e). In Trump’s own
words, it was about making sure that “we are no longer beholden to foreign powers or domestic
radicals. We are powering our Nation on our own terms” (Donald J. Trump, 2020c) and “to
freeing our Nation from reliance on the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
cartel and to helping our friends and allies overseas reduce their dependence on those who seek
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to use energy as a weapon. An energy dominant America is good for Americans -- and good for
the world” (Donald J. Trump, 2017d).
Lying behind the idea of energy sovereignty was a strong antagonistic view towards other
countries who were perceived as potential enemies capable of undermining the United States by
holding its energy supplies hostage. This view was consistent with Trump’s overall xenophobic
and aggressively nationalistic populism where he thrived on vilifying other countries as potential
threats to justify retreats from international collaborations by putting American interests above
everything else.

3.2 American global dominance & international rivals
The Paris Agreement took the most heat under Trump as the signature international
agreement he single-handedly pulled the U.S. out of. This move was framed in a number of ways
to align with his nationalistic populist agenda. The treaty was portrayed as hurting the U.S.
disproportionally while letting other countries run loose from the same obligations. “The Paris
Agreement handicaps the United States economy in order to win praise from the very foreign
capitals and global activists that have long sought to gain wealth at our country's expense…it
would only punish our country while foreign polluters operate with impunity” (Donald J. Trump,
2017e, 2017f). Trump withdrew from the Paris Agreement because he is different from the
politician under the Obama administration who “don't put America first. [But] I do, and I always
will” (Donald J. Trump, 2017e). He further exaggerated its potential harms on the basis of
national security as it was believed to expose the U.S. to “future intrusions on the United States
sovereignty and massive future legal liability” (Donald J. Trump, 2017e). Therefore, “to protect
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those jobs and the sovereignty and freedom of the United States, I followed through on my
promise to withdraw from the Paris Climate Accord” (Donald J. Trump, 2017l).
By painting this picture of America under surge from foreign powers, Trump set the stage
to frame himself as the only president strong enough to stand up to foreign powers to protect
American interests. This image was seconded by Mandy Gunasekara, a former senior adviser
under Trump when she claimed that people view a global agreement led by the United Nations as
an infringement on American sovereignty, and leaving the Paris Agreement “is celebrated by
your average Trump supporter” (Friedman, 2019b).
Aside from the Paris Agreement, Trump strived to assert American dominance in any
possible scenario as a way to fulfill his populist promise of “Making America Great Again.” He
enjoyed showing U.S. superiority by comparing itself with other countries such as China and
India. When it came to pollution, Donald J. Trump (2017e) said, “You look at China, you look at
India, you look at Russia, you look at so many other places, their smokestacks are pouring out.
Everything is pouring out. And I want to be clean. And we're going to be clean.” He hence could
claim that the U.S. had proudly committed to cleaner air and less pollution than its rival
countries. Connecting with earlier points about his pride in U.S.’s natural resource reservoir,
Trump contrasted U.S. and China. He said, “We're lucky. You go to places like China, they don't
have oil and gas. They don't have it under their—they have to go buy it…that costs them a
fortune to go out and buy it. They hurt themselves in the long run…But we have this
unbelievable—the greatest in the world…now we're the number-one—think of it, as I said—the
number-one energy producer in the world” (Donald J. Trump, 2019e).
This pride in America’s natural resources was later used to justify the administration’s
big move to significantly shorten the process for environmental assessment on infrastructural
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projects so that more of these amazing natural resources could be opened to extraction. They
were believed to sustain America’s global competitiveness and dominance in the global energy
field. In the official document for this legislation, the first bullet of the stated purpose in Section
1 included “increased infrastructure investment to strengthen our economy, enhance our
competitiveness in world trade” (Donald J. Trump, 2017b). Similarly, Martin Durbin, the
president of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s Global Energy Institute put it as “a big step
forward and it’s about our nation maintaining its global competitiveness” (Friedman, 2020).
Therefore, the Trump administration’s nationalistic populist grounds for sustaining American
competitiveness and dominance provided ample justification for his anti-environmental agendas
on resource extraction and deregulation.
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VI. Right-wing, Pro-environment Party: National Rally under Marine Le Pen in France

In this chapter, we turn to another right-wing populist party that has been under the
spotlight in the past decade. It took the opposite approach to the environment from that of the
GOP. This chapter investigates the unusual pro-environmental agendas of France’s right-wing
populist party National Rally (Rassemblement National, abbreviated as RN) —formerly known
as National Front (Front National)—under the leadership of Marine Le Pen. Since 2014, RN
stood out as one of the few leading right-wing populist parties in the world that have steered
toward an outright positive stance on environmental issues.
This chapter begins with an overview of RN’s populist campaign and pro-environmental
agendas under the leadership of Le Pen. The following three sections are introduced and later
expanded, each focusing on a distinctive feature of RN’s populist pro-environmental agenda.

Overview: National Rally, Populism, and Pro-environmental Agendas
The French right-wing populist party RN has been a serious contender in French politics,
especially in the most recent decade. RN’s strong presence in French politics and Le Pen’s nearly
successful 2017 presidential campaign made it a leading example of the recent right-wing
populist surge in Europe. The party primes itself on a staunchly nationalistic platform to defend
the French people and the historical French principles of “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity” (Marine
Le Pen, 2017b) against “invasions” from foreign cultures. RN also runs on a clear anti-elite and
anti-globalization (especially anti-EU as it explicitly supports Frexit) platform. It denounces
globalization which is seen as political and economic elites’ proxy to amass personal gains at the
expense of the French public’s wellbeing. RN brands itself as the alternative to the elites, calling
for a “revolution of proximity, local before global.” This motto ties in neatly with RN’s
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promotion of nationalism as Le Pen repeatedly vouches to protect “one language, one culture”
within the “one [French] national community” (Sandford, 2017).
In 2014, when most far-right populist parties in Europe were preoccupied with
campaigning against the Greens for electoral support, RN took an expected turn by launching a
pro-environmental campaign: the New Ecology (Nouvelle écologie ) movement. This New
Ecology movement claimed to present a “patriotic” and “realistic” response to climate change
(Nadal, 2021), and a localized alternative to “ineffective” international climate governance.
Since then, RN pushed for various pro-environmental agendas in its campaign. Proenvironmental elements were notable in Le Pen’s 144 Presidential Commitments during her
2017 presidential race (Marine Le Pen, 2017a), had an active presence on RN websites in the
form of New Ecology Collective (Collectif Nouvelle Ecologie) press releases, and centered RN’s
counter-proposal 15 Questions for Environment, Counter-project Referendum (15 Questions Sur
L’Environnement, Conter-Project de Référendum) against Macron’s environmental plan in 2021
(Rassemblement National, 2021).
The following sections unpack how RN’s pro-environmental agendas are firmly anchored
in its populist rhetoric. They are rooted in three populist elements of RN’s campaign: 1).
Nationalism, feeding the anti-globalization and anti-EU sentiments by promoting local and
patriotic solutions to environmental problems; 2). Anti-elitism, denouncing the existing political
and economic elites while branding RN as the political alternative; and 3). People-centricity,
making its pro-environmental policies responsive to the demands and interests of ordinary
French citizens, especially at the local level.
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Each of the following three sections highlights one general populist feature of RN’s
rhetoric, and then analyzes their applications in RN’s pro-environmental agendas. The first
section is divided into three sub-sections and the other two remain un-divided.
To arrive at this understanding, evidence is drawn from RN’s official statements, announcements
and press releases, RN’s legislative proposals, Le Pen and key party officials’ speeches on
environmental issues, and closely related secondary sources.

1. Patriotic Ecology: Anti-globalization, Anti-EU, and French “Eco-nationalism
The central political conflict of the time, according to Le Pen, is “no longer put the right
and left in opposition, but patriots and globalists” (Sandford, 2017). Le Pen’s populist rhetoric is
deeply rooted in nationalistic and anti-globalization sentiments. She openly denounced her
opponents who support globalization, claiming that “they’ve made an ideology out of it. An
economic globalism which rejects all limits, all regulation of globalization, and which
consequently weakens the immune defenses of the nation state, dispossessing it of its constituent
elements: borders, national currency, the authority of its laws and management of the economy,
thus enabling another globalism to be born and to grow: Islamist fundamentalism” (Sandford,
2017). Le Pen brought the much-needed counterforce to protect the French nation when France
was under surge from the virulent forces of globalization.
This patriotic and anti-globalization rhetoric informed, shaped, and supported Le Pen’s
pro-environmental agendas. Le Pen branded them as patriotic in nature. Yet, they were equally,
if not more, defined by the outward enemies RN claimed to rescue the French nation from, such
as international organizations, the EU, and other powerful countries. Along these lines, RN
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pushed for pro-environmental agendas based on the principle of “nationalistic green localism,”
and opposed to any global climate governance.

1.1 Hervé Juvin and logic of “nationalistic green localism”
The architect of RN’s unique strand of patriotic local environmentalism was Hervé Juvin,
a public intellectual serving as an RN MEP in the European Parliament and a representative of
the French region Pays de la Loire (Baleo, 2019; Nadal, 2021). He coined the term “nationalistic
green localism” centered on the idea that “environmentalism [is] the natural child of patriotism”
(Milman, 2021). RN adopted this principle as the basis for its pro-environmental agendas. It is
essentially populist because RN adopted it to justify itself as the defendant for the ordinary
French people’s way of life against corruptions from neoliberal globalization that had long been
promoted by international organizations and other elite French parties.
RN followed Juvin (2019) to denounce “the globalist swindle that hides behind the
climate alert campaign” and vouched to reclaim the true ecology which “is a matter of local,
singularities, and collective choices” within the French border. In the same speech, Juvin claimed
that “only States in full possession of their territories can control, manage, and limit the activities
of companies or their populations. Only Nations that guarantee the borders and identity of their
people can preserve their culture, their civilization, and the difference in their way of life” (ibid.).
What’s at stake here was not only the French way of life and culture but more importantly,
French national sovereignty and democracy which are prerequisites for the former. When the
globalists asserted that “since climate change does not stop at borders, the solutions are global
and can only come from global organizations that do not know borders nor the sovereignty of
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States, nor democracy!” (Juvin, 2019), Juvin and RN painted them as dangerous threats to the
essence of the French nation.
Juvin’s “nationalistic green localism” successfully weaved the core of RN’s populist
elements into its pro-environmental agendas to form a coherent narrative, merging two fronts
that were previously believed to be incompatible with each other. French patriotism and
nationalism, national borders as legislative boundaries, and preservation of French culture and its
way of life all became part of this patriotic ecological movement. RN’s pro-environmental
agendas, hence, rested on the idea that the French local environment can only be managed and
preserved by French people and local French businesses, free from international interference, and
supported by a patriotic party that understands these principles, the RN. 3

1.2 Anti-globalization and anti-EU: globalists’ failure to protect the environment for the French
people
Carrying out the classic populist strategy of creating the dichotomy of power struggles
between the pure people and their enemies, RN went to great lengths to construct the enemies
who are at odds with RN’s nationalistic environmental agendas. These enemies are the globalists
who have dominated the political arena with their favorable stances towards globalization and
the EU. Le Pen brilliantly summarized this central “us v. them” dichotomy in the opening
statement of her 144 Presidential Commitments:
“This presidential election will bring two visions face to face. The ‘globalist’ choice on
the one hand, represented by all my competitors, which seeks to destroy our great

3

Section 3 will continue and expand the analysis of the localist aspects of RN’s pro-environmental rhetoric.
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economic and social balances, which wants the abolition of all borders, both economic
and physical, and which wants ever more immigration and less cohesion between the
French. The patriotic choice of the other, which I embody in this election, which puts the
defense of the nation and the people at the heart of all public decisions and which above
all wants the protection of our national identity, our independence, the unity of the
French, social justice and prosperity for all” (Marine Le Pen, 2017a, p. 2).

In the speech for her presidential campaign launch, Le Pen made it clear that local sustainability
and environmental friendliness are inseparable from RN’s anti-global populist agenda. She
promised to bring “the second revolution we need…the revolution of proximity local before
global...We want a sustainable economy for France we can achieve the relocation of our
production by a reasonable and calculated use of economic protectionism and by applying
economic patriotism; these are normal economic tools although they are currently prohibited by
the European Union” (Marine Le Pen, 2017b).
In order to achieve this goal of a localist sustainable economy, RN launched a fierce
campaign against any act of global governance, especially those involving the EU. The most
important climate treaty of the decade, the Paris Agreement, was undoubtfully under fire. Juvin
(2019) denounced the Paris Agreement as “a symbol of the impotence of the great globalist
machines that the failure of the Paris Agreement (2015) despite the resounding communiqués,
whose objectives will not be kept, and most of the participants do not even hold the desired
direction!” RN claimed that international treaties could never achieve the goals they desire
because of their unwillingness to halt international free trade. RN considered global free trade a
major contributor to climate change because it “push the lowest environmental bidder and
increase the pollution linked to transport” (Marine Le Pen, 2017c). According to RN “the
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reduction of greenhouse gases would in fact be increased tenfold if we agreed to call into
question an economic model of globalized free trade, which is structurally bad for the
environment,” and therefore bad for French people (Front National, 2015).
In addition to the inherent inability of international treaties to address what RN sees as
the root of environmental problems—global free trade—it also antagonized international
organizations. EU was their primary target, vilified for its ineffective, technocratic, and
bureaucratic environmental governance. This corrupt international governance model was
imposed on countries like France. In a New Ecology Collective press release objecting to the
Kigali Agreement, RN explicated this logic by saying that “we are opposed to ineffective and
dangerous supranational mechanisms, where decisions and actions are imposed from above on
nations and therefore on peoples” (Collectif Nouvelle Ecologie, 2016a).
RN also took every opportunity to catch the EU’s failed attempts to protect the
environment, proving its incompetency at addressing environmental problems at the supernational level. On EU’s belated action on banning bee-killing pesticides, RN “denounce[d] the
deadly deficiencies of the Brussels technocracy” and claimed “this ban is a salvation for
professionals but the damage to our ecosystems is immense and partly irreversible” (Odoul,
2018). It highlighted the EU’s failure in enforcing strict diesel standards as a sign of corruption
from “the disproportionate weight of lobbies in the decisions of the European Commission…The
European Commission knew, the European Commission lied and did not protect the
Europeans. Worse, the European Commission continues to lie” (Collectif Nouvelle Ecologie,
2015b). And, in the case of regulating endocrine disruptors, since the French Minister of the
Environment Ségolène Royal “considers the definition of endocrine disruptors presented by the
European Commission to be ‘unacceptable.’ It became clear that the protection of living
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organisms and consumers cannot be achieved within the framework of the European Union”
(Philippe Murer & Richermoz, 2016).
In all these cases, RN employed a classic populist dichotomy to portray the EU as the
enemy of the French people on environmental matters. Using this antagonistic framework, RN
took every opportunity to show the incompetency and ineffectiveness of the technocratic
international governance model. In addition, participants of international treaties were also
treated as puppets of special interests to cripple French values and undermine the interests of the
French people.

1.3 In defense of France: calling for patriotic ecology
Denouncing international climate actions as ineffective and corrupt was in the common
right-wing populist parties’ playbook. However, what’s special about RN’s environmental
agendas was that it took a step further from simply denouncing international climate actions as
useless and ineffective. RN proposed its own solutions to environmental problems based on its
principle of patriotic ecology, as Jordan Bardella, the head of RN’s European election candidates
list put it, “Borders are the environment’s greatest ally; it is through them that we will save the
planet” (Mazoue, 2019).
RN introduced its own version of patriotic climate action, inspired by Juvin’s
“nationalistic green localism” and in fierce opposition to any international governance. As Juvin
(2019) laid out, the internal logic of this patriotic environmentalism is that “we will refuse any
provision that, under the guise of a good green conscience, would undermine the customs,
traditions, craft practices and the agricultural or gastronomic way of doing things in France.”
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The New Ecology movement was crafted under such a framework. An RN environmental
committee member and MEP Mireille d’Ornano said that “the New Ecology movement is based
on national interest and patriotism. We have to be closer to our people and not against our
country’s interests” (Neslen, 2014). One of the cornerstones of RN’s environmental agendas was
the promotion of nuclear power as they framed it as a matter of “national sovereignty,” of the
“nation's energy independence,” and the best energy source to secure national control over
energy generation (Collectif Nouvelle Ecologie, 2016b; Marine Le Pen, 2017a; Maréchal Le Pen
& Collard, 2014).
In Le Pen’s 144 Presidential Commitments, she proposed a considerable number of
sustainability measures in section VII titled “A Sustainable France.” They were founded on the
principle of patriotic ecology with explicit references to “economic patriotism” (Marine Le Pen,
2017a). In the sub-section “France, An Agricultural Power At The Service Of Healthy Food,” Le
Pen called for “apply[ing] economic patriotism to French agricultural products in order to
immediately support our farmers and fishermen,” “transform[ing] the Common Agricultural
Policy into a French Agricultural Policy,” and “ban[ing] the import of agricultural and food
products that do not respect French production standards” (Marine Le Pen, 2017a). She aimed at
transforming French agriculture into a nationalistic, local-based, protectionist sector and
applying environmental standards that are only specifically crafted to fit the French agricultural
sector. In the sub-section “Environment And Energy Transition: France Must Aim For
Excellence,” promises on nationalistic and local ecology were made “to preserve the
environment, break with the economic model based on the unbridled globalization,” and to
“massively develop the French renewable energy sectors (solar, biogas, wood...) through
intelligent protectionism, economic patriotism” (Marine Le Pen, 2017a).
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To replace the ineffective and harmful international climate governance, RN presented its
own counter-projects based on nationalistic ideals. On the EU’s belated action on banning beekilling pesticides, RN “reaffirms that the effective and sustainable safeguarding of biodiversity
requires the reclaiming of the sovereignty of each nation” (Odoul, 2018). On diesel regulations,
RN proposed to abandon the EU standard since “it is time for a French public agency…to see the
light of day and be the only one to control the level of pollution emitted by vehicles sold in
France, to authorize their marketing” (Collectif Nouvelle Ecologie, 2015b). Defending its Frexit
agenda while denouncing the EU’s unsafe standards on endocrine disruptors, RN called for
“tak[ing] back our sovereignty to protect our citizens with regulations that serve their interests
and not those of ‘agribusiness’ multinationals…Yes, ecology goes through Frexit!” When it
comes to Nexcis, a French start-up innovating photovoltaic renewable energy met by fierce
global competition, RN voiced its unwavering support for Nexcis as a “French initiative, French
genius, and patriotic ecology” (Collectif Nouvelle Ecologie, 2015a). Therefore “for the
employment, independence, and climate protection, we [RN] therefore call for a New Ecology,
revolutionary since it is patriotic, proud, and courageous in the challenges ahead” (ibid.).
All these initiatives and rhetoric employed by RN show a consistent populist anchoring of its
pro-environmental agendas in its populist anti-globalization and anti-EU rhetoric. RN also
pushed for various alternative proposals and initiatives in response to the failure of globalization
and Europeanization. RN was able to package its alternative environmental policies in the form
of populistic, nationalistic, and local ecology. It was a continuation of its populist appeal as the
only French party genuinely representing and advocating for the interests of the French people
against threats to the French way of life from the imposition of international technocratic
environmental governance.
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2. Say No to “Professor Macron” and Corporate Interests: A Party for People’s Ecology
Paralleling with RN’s strong anti-globalization and anti-EU rhetoric, another group of
enemies central to its populist framing is the corrupt elites who sustain and benefit from the
nation’s political and economic status quo. Two groups were particularly under fire from RN’s
populist pro-environmental rhetoric: Macron and other dominant political parties in France, and
corporate elites both at home and abroad.
The core of any populist rhetoric is pitting the pure people against corrupt elites. In many
cases, the corrupt elites refer to some form of the existing political establishment, parties in
power, or current political leaders. For RN, this is not an exception. RN was particularly critical
of Macron and his administration, especially during Le Pen’s presidential campaign in 2017
when she was competing head-to-head against Macron. Le Pen’s loath for the political
establishment was evident in her presidential campaign launch speech where she said, “The
candidates, either left-wing or right-wing, but both guided by financial interests, I am the
candidate of the people” (Marine Le Pen, 2017b). An iconic populist moment to brand herself as
the candidate of the people as opposed to those representing elite special interests.
One of the easiest ways for Le Pen to criticize the current establishment on the
environmental front was to connect such criticism with RN’s anti-globalization rhetoric,
claiming any international agreement signed by the current administration as a betrayal of the
French people for their own selfish gains. For example, Emmanuelle Cosse, the National
Secretary of the EELV for France, was accused by Le Pen in a 2014 televised debate on BFMTV
of “promoting a profoundly anti-ecological model through the European Union and the absence
of borders” (Martin, 2014). Immediately following that, Le Pen presented her newly crafted
nationalistic New Ecology movement as an alternative for the people. During the same time

68

when RN was pushing for its New Ecology agenda, it vilified the Green party. RN’s general
secretary, Nicolas Bay, stated that “they have managed to make us, the very people who are so
attached to the flora, fauna, and landscapes of our beautiful country, hate political
environmentalism” (Machin & Wagener, 2019). By delegitimizing other parties’ environmental
agendas, RN set itself apart as the only party that can act according to the French people’s
interests.
The New Ecology Collective press release on RN’s official website had always been a
powerful campaign tool for RN to express its contempt for other parties’ environmental policies
while branding its own proposals as the only genuinely people-centered environmental solutions.
The current administration’s regulations over private automobiles and the promotion of public
transportations were under storm. RN decried legislators who ignored the need to reform Paris’s
old metro and RER systems which were believed by RN as the real culprits of fine-partial
pollution in Paris. “Madame Hidalgo [mayor of Paris], a great bobo ideologue” was accused of
being “on a crusade against diesel and the automobile in general” where “this major problem of
pollution in the subways does not seem to concern the socialists who have a selective indignation
at the pollution” (Philippe Murer & Richermoz, 2015). Along the same lines, Christophe
Najdovski, Mayor Hidalgo's deputy in charge of travel was portrayed as aloof and out of touch
with the people when he supported the promotion of public transportation in Paris. RN mocked
his detachment from the people by saying, “Mr. Najdovski lives off the grid, in an imaginary
country” (de Saint-just, 2015).
Another example would be legislations restricting hunter activities to protect biodiversity.
RN used the same populist framework to say that “the actors of the territories have been
excluded from the discussions that concern them primarily. Such a process shows the contempt
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of the government and the Greens for our fellow citizens in rural areas… The ‘ecologist’
deputies…make their sectarianism triumph by destroying the hunting activity and its traditions”
(M. M. Le Pen, 2015). In this case, not only were the political elites out of touch with the people,
RN also implied the dysfunctionality of the political system which enabled this unilateral
political decision to be made in the first place, without any consultation with the people affected.
And RN, as a political alternative with its localist principles, would ensure future decisions “to
be taken as close as possible to the citizens and directly controlled by them” as Le Pen (2017a)
promised in her 144 Presidential Commitments.
During the Yellow Vest movement in 2018, French citizens took the streets to voice
grievances against the government’s newly imposed tax on fuel and crude oil. The protests grew
and morphed into demonstrations against economic inequality, high cost of living, and
unresponsiveness from the government to grassroots demands. This was the perfect populist
crowd for RN to appeal to. Le Pen and RN publicly supported protesters, framing fuel taxation as
“punitive environmentalism” promoted by a bohemian bourgeois elite in Paris who “shut in their
pretty offices with nice moldings on their ceiling and absolutely no connection to the situation of
our compatriots” (Higgins, 2018). The Macron administration was criticized as again, out of
touch with the ordinary people when he mistakenly “believes them to be [lazy], [while they are
nothing] but poor workers, admirable single mums and needy pensioners” (La Tribune, 2019).
Jorden Bardella, the young candidate leading RN’s list for the European elections, stood
up to criticize the “great false debate” which was “completely locked down” by “interminable
lectures orchestrated by professor Macron” (ibid.) who kept justifying environmental goals at the
expense of ordinary citizens’ interests. Le Pen denounced taxation on diesel "because it is the
lower classes who will be the direct victims” (Bauduin, 2017). Le Pen’s own environmentally

70

sound alternatives proposed that "the State must invest massively in the search for hydrogen
cars", which she believed to be the "cleanest" vehicles out there (ibid.).
Another group of French elites that was targeted by RN was the corporate/economic
elites who have been making an enormous amount of profit under the current administration.
One way that the economic elites undermined the interests of ordinary French people was by
taking advantage of pro-environmental policies. Juvin (2019) believed that “too often, the
ecological requirement is diverted to the benefit of multinationals and dominant players, simply
because of the complexity of the rules and standards.”
These economic profiteers were also everywhere in the EU. “The financial world [is]
rubbing its hands at the idea of the hundreds of billions that the [European] Union is committed
to spending on objectives that are as uncertain as they are distant - the commissions of the
financial intermediaries will be very real, as will the incomes of the NGOs and agencies that will
award them their certificate of good ecological conduct!” (Juvin, 2019). In this case, the
government bureaucrats, technocrats, and corporate elites operate like a revolving door at both
the national and international levels to make environmental legislations inaccessible to the
ordinary people so that they can benefit personally in the name of the environment. In response,
Le Pen promised in her 144 Presidential Commitments that she will put an end to this practice, “I
also want to give the French people their money back, because for too many years, our social and
fiscal policies have impoverished the middle and working classes, while enriching the
multinationals and squandering public money” (Marine Le Pen, 2017a, p. 2).
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3. Environment with Borders: French Environment for French People Only
Last but not least, after setting up both globalizing powers and national elites as enemies
of the people, RN seized the opportunity to bring the populist narrative to a full circle with direct
appeals to the virtuous people. The people’s interests were sacrificed by the governing elites, but
will be redeemed once RN is in power.
In Le Pen’s pivotal 2017 presidential campaign launch speech, she declared, “I am the
candidate of the people” and “No French person, no part of France…must be forgotten” (Marine
Le Pen, 2017a, p. 2). To support that, she promised that RN “want[s] every French citizen…to
feel supported by the national community and by a careful and benevolent state. We want a
strong state, we want a state that plays a strategic role in the economy and who could blame us
for it is you the people who embody the state and what the state is, the instrument to fulfill your
will” (Marine Le Pen, 2017b). Le Pen essentially promised to put the state, under her and RN if
the campaign was successful, directly at the service of the people.
This idea of people-centrality anchored RN’s environmental agendas in two ways. The
first was direct and explicit, translated into RN’s promises to convert people’s will into
environmental policies. Previous sections touched on instances where RN countered political
enemies and showed direct support for the people on environmental issues, such as backing the
Yellow Vest movement, denouncing international treaties and the EU’s negligence of French
people’s interest, and proposing alternative policies for people’s interests in areas of air pollution
and hunting rights. In RN’s 2021 Counter-project Referendum on ecology, a list of fifteen
questions was proposed “to be decided by the French people, the proposed law to organize this
consultation and the proposed constitutional law to translate the results of the popular vote on
ecology” (Durand, 2021; Rassemblement National, 2021, p. 3). This was an attempt by RN to
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root for direct democracy of the people on ecological matters. Such emphasis on direct
democracy was also shown in RN’s statements scolding Macron’s General State of the Food
where “ordinary French people - individuals, associations - in short, ‘sixty million consumers’
were left out of the discussion on structuring subjects of food, to improve its quality and cost, all
in the service of relocated employment and respect of our environment” (Collectif Nouvelle
Ecologie, 2017). RN promised its own version of “a French Agricultural Policy” to consult with
and protect the interests of French farmers.
The second way in which RN’s environmental policies were tailored toward the people
was more implicit and rested on the principle of “a human ecology.” Juvin (2019) put it as “the
political ecology that we propose is first and foremost a human ecology, which places in the
foreground the respect of peoples and their diversity, diversity of customs, beliefs and traditions,
of political regimes, diversity of economic, legal and social systems.” This seemingly inclusive
framework was bounded by national borders. The traditions, customs and people referred to in
Juvin’s statement were under a nationalistic context. In the same speech, Juvin (2019) went on to
explain that “authentic ecologists are those Europeans rooted in a region, a city, a village, who
are from somewhere, and who want to remain at home” and “ecology is a matter of local,
singularities, and collective choices.” This localist ecology was envisioned to take the form of
direct democracy of the people in different French regions to make the best decisions for their
homeland. This vision was usually discussed in the context of anti-globalization and the New
Ecology movement, as shown in previous sections.
One practical example of this pro-environmental, people-centered localism can be found
in the city of Hénin-Beaumont. The city implemented LED bulbs for all street and building
lights, gave free trees for homeowners to shield against heat waves, and built a field dedicated to
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the “eco-grazing” of sheep (Onishi, 2019). All of these environmentally-friendly changes were
implemented by RN members in the city administrations, as a pioneering example to show how
responsive, people-based environmental solutions look like under the RN framework.
Christopher Szczurek, a deputy mayor of Hénin-Beaumont and a member of RN’s national board
commented that “for a long time, political parties took ahold of ecology and aimed it only at the
bourgeois and well-off. and now we see that the working class can also find something of real
interest in it” (Onishi, 2019). This city’s project homed in on the idea of RN being a party for the
ordinary people by crafting and implementing people-centered environmental solutions close to
their homes.
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VII. Left-wing, Pro-environment Party: Podemos under Pablo Iglesias in Spain
In Southwestern Europe, another country’s populist party also campaigned on proenvironmental agendas. This chapter focuses on Spain’s progressive, breakthrough left-wing
populist party Podemos (meaning “We Can”) during its prominent years between 2014 and 2021.
Podemos had two major environmental initiatives incorporated into its political campaign and
leveraged its populist pro-environmental platforms to attract predominantly young voters. I
found the lowest number of sources regarding its environmental agendas among the four cases,
partly as a result of its dwindling support in later years, the limited number of environmental
issues it focused on, its over-generalized proposals, and it being the most moderate party among
the four in terms of campaign rhetoric.
This chapter begins with an overview of Podemos’ rise and fall as a breakthrough
populist party in Spain, and then goes into summarizing its pro-environmental agendas.
Following the overview, two sections are introduced and later expanded, each focusing on a
distinctive feature of Podemos’ populist pro-environmental agenda.

Overview: Podemos, Populism, and Pro-environmental Agendas
Podemos, a left-wing populist party, grabbed the spotlight as a rapidly rising disruptor in
Spanish politics in the 2010s. Created from the indigenous anti-austerity movement (15-M
movement) in 2011, Podemos was led by former political science professor Pablo Iglesias who
borrowed extensively from Laclau’s theory of populism (Barriere, Durgan, & Robson, 2015;
Hancox, 2015). The anti-corruption sentiments and grievances towards the failure of the 1978
constitutional settlement during the 15-M movement were carried on by Podemos as a central
component of its left-wing populist rhetoric. Podemos branded itself as serving the “popular
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unity and citizenship” to reclaim sovereignty and democracy that was held hostage by the
oligarchic “caste,” and to hand them back to the Spanish people (Errejón, 2014).
Carrying over its strong populist platform and mass support from the 15-M movement,
Podemos won its first political representation in the 2014 European Parliament election with
7.97% votes (1,245,948 votes) (Errejón, 2014; Zarzalejos, 2016). Following that, Podemos won
around 20% of the votes casted in both the 2015 and 2016 general elections. It became the third
largest parliamentary party in the 2016 general election, gaining representation in all regions
(Rodríguez-Teruel, Barrio, & Barberà, 2016). In 2020, the left-wing alliance Unidas Podemos
centered on Podemos and the left-wing Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (Partido Socialista
Obrero Español, abbreviated as PSOE) broke the 80-year bipartisan deadlock in Spain to form a
coalition government (Jones, 2020, 2021; Rios, 2019). Although losing support since 2021 due
to the failure to realize its electoral promises and the resignation of Iglesias from all party posts,
Podemos had been a serious political contender in Spanish politics for a decade, with a stream of
revolutionary and invigorating ideas that have left long-lasting effects on Spanish politics for
years to come (Sola & Rendueles, 2018).
Campaigning as a progressive left-wing populist party with a strong emphasis on a young
voter base, Podemos had placed environmental issues at its core since day one. It was critical of
leading parties’ environmental policies, vocal on various environmental issues, proposed the
Green New Deal (inspired by, and the name taken from the Green New Deal proposal in the
U.S.), and took a step further to propose its own Green Horizon Plan (Plan Horizonte Verde)
when existing environmental proposals were too moderate for its taste. Compared to right-wing
parties’ fierce and purposeful framing of their environmental agendas, Podemos’s environmental
efforts seemed to be shy of flames. It is also the only party among the four cases that did not
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have a strong nationalistic or anti-globalization rhetoric attached to its environmental agendas.
Yet, looking closely at Podemos’ pro-environmental agendas, they were not short of sparks that
effortlessly weaved their populist elements into their pro-environmental agendas.
The following analysis dissects Podemos’ pro-environmental agendas to show how they
are deeply rooted in two core elements of its populist rhetoric: 1). People-centricity, framing its
pro-environmental agendas as projects initiated by and serving the demands of the common
Spanish people; and 2). Anti-elitism, demonizing the political and economic elites as the enemy
of the people who have betrayed their electorate and benefitted from Spain’s stagnant political
reality.
Each of the next two sections dives into one key feature of Podemos’ populist proenvironmental rhetoric. Each section begins with an overview of one particular feature of
Podemos’ general populist rhetoric, and then transitions into dissecting its connections with
Podemos’ pro-environmental agendas. The first section is broken down into two sub-sections
while the second section is undivided.
Evidence for this section is drawn from written and video materials published by the
official Podemos website and channels, writings and speeches by key Podemos leaders, and
secondary journalistic reports and scholarly literature related to Podemos’ pro-environmental
agendas.

1. We Can: A People’s Movement for the Spanish Environment
Podemos’s left-wing populist rhetoric centered around the idea of direct participatory
democracy. As Iglesias put it, the idea behind the party is as straightforward as “citizens doing
politics. If the citizens don't get involved in politics, others will. And that opens the door to them
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robbing you of democracy, your rights and your wallet” (Kassam, 2014). Podemos brands itself
as not only a party that stands up and advocates for citizens’ rights, but also as a party where "we
don't want to structure ourselves in the same closed off way… We're a citizen force, made up of
people who got together and ran an electoral campaign practically without any money,"
according to Iñigo Errejón, Podemos’ campaign director (ibid.).
One key strategy of Podemos’ campaign was centered on the principle of participatory
democracy by the general public. Podemos' primaries for the European elections were open to
anyone who wanted to participate and attracted 33,000 voters in 2014 (ibid.). A cornerstone of
the Podemos’ projects was indignado-style “circles,” or assemblies to unite local communities to
meet, debate, or vote (Tremlett, 2015). These populist actions were intended, as Errejón (2014)
put it, to create a party that is “headed by people that express new ways to relate to politics and
represent a real threat for the two-party system…and those who have hijacked our democracy.”
This people-centricity of Podemos’ populist style anchored its environmental agendas
and policy proposals from the Green New Deal to the Green Horizon Plan and influenced its
positions on various environmental issues. Podemos also openly campaigned on a proenvironmental platform, “Podemos has championed the fight against climate change politically
in Spain since its inception, including in all its electoral programs proposals and key measures to
combat it and curb its devastating effects” (Podemos, 2019a).
The following two sub-sections unpack how the populist people-centricity played out in
Podemos’ pro-environmental rhetoric in two ways.
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1.1 Of the people: direct democracy and participatory politics for the environment
Since the very beginning of Podemos’ campaign, they made it clear that Podemos will
listen to and respond to the people, especially young people’s demands for effective
environmental actions. Podemos’ members have worked on different fronts to respond to its
constituencies. Txema Guijarro, a member of the Spanish parliament for Podemos said in an
interview, “When we mobilize, we change things… and the young people who have come out
onto the street telling us we do not have two planets” (Guijarro, 2019). Similar messages had
been broadcasted on Podemos’ official YouTube channel. In a campaign video for their Green
New Deal—the most prominent pro-environmental legislations supported by the Podemos—the
narration by a young woman went, “Students from all over the world are mobilizing and finding
their own ways of doing politics to demand real and courageous actions against climate change.
Hundreds of thousands of young people say…that if the planet were a bank, we would have
already rescued it…We need to…turn this economic system insensitive to the care of the people
and the planet and incompatible with respect for the rights of the majority and also of nature”
(Podemos, 2019b).
In both cases, Podemos communicated directly to its followers to show that it is listening
to the voices of young people, a major source of its electoral support. Then, Podemos branded its
policy orientations as a response to their demands. The Green New Deal video ended with the
narrator saying, “We [the youth] are the ones who will have to live that future. If we want, we
can” (ibid). Podemos used the pun of Podemos meaning “we can” to send the message of itself
being a party that is built on and responding to people’s calls for climate action.
Transitioning to Podemos’ more ambitious Green Horizon Plan in 2020, the appeal to the
people as architects for Spain’s climate future was reinforced. In the official announcement for
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the Green Horizon Plan, it pointed out that “the implementation of these measures [in the Green
Horizon Plan] will require an unprecedented mobilization of all the productive and intellectual
energies of our country” (Podemos, 2019a). Such “mobilization” implied that Podemos intended
to pull resources from people across the country to make it a collective project for the
environment. It “is a participatory politics where we appeal to a certain kind of people
power…basing ourselves on mass mobilization” (Guijarro, 2019).

1.2 For the people: Podemos’ environmental agendas at people’s service
In conjunction with the idea of being responsive to people’s demands on environmental
issues, Podemos went at length to promise that its policy proposals will be centered on the
Spanish people’s interests. Podemos’ pro-environmental agendas were branded as not only
democratically drafted by the people, but also carefully crafted for them. The element of peoplecentricity was articulated by one of Podemos’ MEPs, Pablo Echenique, “You cannot take care of
the environment without taking care of people first” (Podemos, 2019a). Further, Podemos’ proenvironmental agendas promised that it would not let the burden of sustainability fall
disproportionally on them as it had been before. To this end, Unidas Podemos stated, “It is clear
that the cost of an ecological transition cannot be borne by those who are most affected. The cost
has to be for those who have polluted the most. That is why we are talking about a change in the
production model... because it has to decrease from above and not from below" (Gallego, 2019).
One of the core pro-environmental initiatives pushed by Podemos was transitioning
energy companies’ ownership from private to fully public via establishing “a national company”
(Guijarro, 2019). As early as 2014, the Green New Deal was committed to “establish a number
of strategic public companies… [including] a state investment bank so as to secure Spain’s
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energy transition to 100 percent renewables over the next 20 years” (ibid.). Podemos framed it as
the most democratic form of governance over energy production and the foundation for replacing
fossil fuel with renewable energy. Not only did public ownership line up neatly with Podemos’
left-wing ideologies, but public ownership in Podemos’ populist blueprint also meant ownership
by the Spanish people, aligning with its populist principle of people-centricity.
The creation of more jobs for the Spanish people was also one of the core promises in
Podemos’ pro-environmental agendas. The Green New Deal claimed to “generate quality jobs,
reduce inequalities, and take care of the planet as a priority” (Podemos, 2019b). According to
Pablo Ecnenique, the Green New Deal aimed “to create hundreds of quality jobs, increase
innovation, recover migrated talent, and start a path to compete at the top in the value-added
industry” (Podemos, 2019a). All the goals envisioned were tailored toward making the Spanish
economy stronger and more sustainable for the welfare of its people. Later, the Green Horizon
Plan explicitly promised “the creation of two jobs for each job that is lost will be guaranteed by
law” (ibid.). On the issue of fighting wildfires, specifically, Podemos resolved to “improving the
working conditions of professionals and increasing the size of the workforce” (ibid.). All of the
environmental issues and solutions proposed by Podemos were framed to prioritize ordinary
Spanish citizens’ interests.

2. No More Special Interests: Podemos’ Anti-elite Pro-environmental Agendas
As the breakthrough party in Spanish politics, Podemos put significant efforts into
constructing its identity as radically different from the ruling elites who were the culprits of “the
two-party system…and those who have hijacked our democracy” (Errejón, 2014). The elite caste
(la casta), was “a diffuse term that could include politicians, bankers, speculators, and any other
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privileged group” (Sola & Rendueles, 2018). These elites sustained and benefited from Spain’s
corrupt and stagnant political, social, and economic system. They were oblivious to people’s
plight. The elites selfishly utilized their privilege for personal gains instead of serving the
ordinary people. Iglesias made this clear by saying, “Look, those people are your enemies”
(Tremlett, 2015) and openly called the super-rich “enemies of Spain” (Guijarro, 2019).
In contrast to the elites, Podemos branded itself as the true alternative representing the
real interests of the people. For example, Iglesias claimed that MEPs representing other parties in
Spain "travel to Brussels in business class” and have “colluded with lobbyists behind the scenes”
(Kassam, 2014). Iglesias, on the other hand, claimed to be the down-to-earth outsider and
promised that “if any lobby group approaches us, we'll make that information public" (ibid.).
Errejón (2014) backed this rhetoric by saying that “Podemos was born as a tool in the service of
‘popular unity and citizenship’, namely the articulation of ‘floating’ discontent in order to create
a popular mobilization to reclaim sovereignty and democracy held hostage by the oligarchic
caste.” Podemos also highlighted its approaches to party financing issues to set itself apart from
wealthy parties. They asserted that “we’re doing a people’s campaign, we need to show how
we’re different. The others get checks from banks — we appeal to our own base” (Guijarro,
2019). Podemos presented itself as a tool for the people to overturn the monopoly of power by
the elites and to finally run the country democratically for their real interests.
This strong anti-elite sentiment anchored many items in Podemos’ pro-environmental
agendas. In Podemos’ campaign video for the Green New Deal, the narrator highlighted that “the
economic crisis of the last decade has left clear winners and losers while precariousness has
increased, and inequality have not been reversed… The great fortunes of the banks, the vulture
funds and the larger energy companies have seen their profits multiply… [They] cannot, even if
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they wanted to make these changes a reality” (Podemos, 2019b). The entire package was based
on the premise that the elites who benefited from the past economic crises have neither the
willingness nor means to build a more sustainable and equitable system in Spain. Therefore,
Podemos, as the political alternative standing up for the Spanish people, declared itself the
solution people needed by advancing “sets of measures which have never really been seen in
Spain before” (Guijarro, 2019). Podemos took a step further in its more radical Green Horizon
Plan with two central measures: “The prohibition of revolving doors between public officials
and the boards of directors” and “The creation of a public energy company” (Gallego, 2019).
Plans for the energy sector played a major part in Podemos’s anti-elite pro-environmental
agendas. Iglesias exposed a list of former political leaders who were members of major energy
corporations’ boards of directors (these corporations included Endesa Iberdrola, Naturgy,
Abengoa, and Enagas.). Iglesias concluded that “if these companies buy former ministers and
former presidents, it is impossible to face the challenges of climate change” (ibid.). They set out
to prove that the elites gained significant profits from such privatization of energy, “The profit
margin of the large Spanish electricity companies (for their business in Spain) practically
doubles that of their European counterpart: what we could call ‘extra profits’… amount
to €9,400 million. This money has come out of the consumer's pocket” (Podemos, 2016). To
change the status quo, Iglesias promised to replace the “oligarchies” running private electricity
companies with public energy companies that will serve the interests of the people and “to
guarantee that no one suffer from energy poverty” (Gallego, 2019). Podemos laid out its
nationalization campaign based on the principle that “access to energy, like access to housing or
education, is a citizen's right” (Podemos, 2016).
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On the growing frequency of devastating forest fires, Podemos linked their causes to the
inability of the current government to manage forests as a result of elite profiteering. Podemos
claimed that “economic interests exert a great influence on the forest floor: they socialize the
environmental losses and impacts and privatize the benefits, leaving aside the majority interest of
the citizenry…covert privatization and the precariousness of salaries, has fueled the fire busines”
(Podemos Environmental Area, 2017). The corrupt elites not only ignored the growing risks of
wildfires, but also found ways to profit from these natural disasters. Podemos, in response,
proposed various policies to preserve forest “ecosystems and the sustainable natural
landscape…the hallmarks of the rural environment” (Podemos Environmental Area, 2017). It
also made promises of forest management based on the needs of rural populations who felt left
behind by private interests and distant governing bodies.
Podemos (2015) published an official statement on the World Environment Day, stating
that,
“Governments, by kidnapping institutions, protect an unsustainable production model
that is causing the depletion of natural resources, energy geo-dependence and the
greatest environmental problem facing Humanity: Climate Change…The kidnapping by
public administrations that should watch over nature and make Spain progress towards
sustainability, has launched partisan policies favoring a privileged minority while
resources are depleted, our rivers and mountains are polluted and our unique species
they perish… We are faced with the political responsibility of abandoning any policy that
does not assume that there is only one planet and that it is finite.”
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This quote encapsulated Podemos’ anti-elite logic behind its populist pro-environmental
agendas. Podemos centered its rhetoric on criticisms of elites’ corruption and self-interests as
well as presented itself as the new political alternative serving the interests of the people.
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VIII. Left-wing, Anti-environment Party: Chávez and Maduro’s Regime in Venezuela

Last but not least, this final case study brings us to Venezuela, in Latin America. The
country has been under a left-wing, Socialist populist regime for decades, led by a succession of
two authoritarian leaders, Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro. For a country with heavy reliance
on the extraction of natural resources, Venezuela has always relied on anti-environment agendas
in the sense that its policies and rhetoric justified the extraction of fossil fuels and minerals. The
populist rhetoric employed by both Venezuelan presidents didn’t usually address environmental
issues directly as opposed to other populist leaders’ rhetoric discussed in previous chapters. This
case exemplifies a particular kind of indirect anti-environmental agendas that is, nonetheless,
firmly anchored in a populist rhetoric.
This chapter begins with an overview of both Chavez and Maduro’s populist style as well
as laying out Venezuelan’s trajectory of anti-environmental agendas under their governance.
Then, four subsequent sections detail the populist elements anchoring Chávez and Maduro’s
anti-environmental agendas.

Overview: Chávez and Maduro, Populism, and Anti-environmental Agendas
Hugo Chávez and his successor Nicolás Maduro have been charismatic populist leaders
of Venezuela for over two decades. Chávez led the country with the left-wing Socialist Fifth
Republic Movement (Movimiento Quinta República) during his first 10 years in office and then
founded the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela,
abbreviated as PSUV) in 2007. PSUV had since supported both him and Maduro as the dominant
party of Venezuela. The following paragraphs will introduce Chávez and Maduro’s left-wing
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populist style and their anti-environment agendas to set up for more detailed analysis in
upcoming sections.
Roberts (2012, p. 136) claimed that “Chávez was arguably the most quintessential
populist figure Latin America had seen since Juan Perón…However populism was defined,
Chávez fit, as he seemingly embodied whatever core and ancillary properties were attached to
the concept.” There seems to be a broad consensus on Chávez’s prominence as Latin America’s
most iconic populist leader (e.g. Hawkins, 2009; Sagarzazu & Thies, 2018; Zúquete, 2008). This
was also demonstrated by Chávez’s cornerstone Socialistic project Chavismo. It was founded on
the populist and “morally constructed antagonistic duality between a virtuous ‘people’ (el
pueblo) and an incorrigibly venal and corrupt elite (the oligarchy or, more colorfully, the ‘rancid
oligarchy’ in the parlance of Chavismo)” (Roberts, 2012, p. 136).
Chávez positioned himself as the true representative of the people by campaigning for
Socialist programs such as massive social spending from oil revenues, nationalization of key
industries, and a direct form of democracy “based on plebiscitarian expressions of popular
sovereignty and grassroots participation in community organizations and self-governing
structures” (Farnsworth, 2021; Roberts, 2012, p. 137). Maduro, as the hand-picked successor for
Chávez, followed his footsteps to continue this Chavistas left-wing populist campaign as he
asserted that “I am doing nothing else but fulfilling the mission entrusted to me by Comandante
President Hugo Chávez Frías as I have been doing and as I will do out of love for his person and
his work" (Venezuela, 2013). Aside from his dubious electoral victory after Chávez’s death and
fraud allegations overshadowing subsequent elections, Maduro clung to power with his populist
rhetoric’s appeal and legitimization. He defended himself by saying that “I, Nicolás
Maduro Moros, am a genuinely and profoundly democratic president” (Phillips, 2019).
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Abiding by the textbook populist style, Chávez was very skillful at positioning himself as
the political alternative for the people against threats from enemies abroad and elites at home.
Reminiscent of Venezuela’s anti-colonial struggles, anti-imperialist sentiments have always been
a central component of Chávez’s populism. They particularly targeted the U.S., their
“imperialistic neighbor.” Chávez portrayed the United States as a looming imperialistic threat to
Venezuelan freedom and independence, especially after “Washington’s thinly veiled support for
the military coup that briefly removed him from office in April 2002” (Roberts, 2012, pp. 144146). In addition to enemies abroad, Chávez also put considerable efforts into demonizing the
political and economic elites at home, especially regarding the oil oligarchy and elites’
corruption. Positioning himself as the polar opposite of these “evil” forces, Chávez painted
himself as the true outsider and representative of the people, promising to “care for the lower
classes, work to eradicate neoliberalism, and continue to challenge the imperialists in the United
States” (Ellner, 2003).
In his 2006 campaign closing speech (Hawkins, 2009), Chávez put all these populist
elements and his “cosmic” struggle against the evil into perspective by saying:
“Let no one forget that we are confronting the Devil himself. Sunday, 3 December at the
ballot box. We will confront the imperialist government of the United States of North
America [sic]—that is our real adversary, not these has-beens here, these lackeys of
imperialism. . . Because you are not going to reelect Chávez really you are going to
reelect yourselves, the people will reelect the people. Chávez is nothing but an instrument
of the people.”
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Continuing the populist legacy of Chávez, Maduro carried on his core populist rhetoric. In his
80-minute address to fellow Chavistas and international leftist allies, Maduro said (Phillips,
2019):
“Stop, Europe … Don’t come again with your old colonialism. Don’t come again with
your old aggression. Don’t come again, old Europe, with your old racism. There’s been
enough enslavement – the looting that you subjected us to for 500 years … We are a true,
profound, popular, and revolutionary democracy … not a democracy of the elites … of
super-millionaires who go into power to enrich their economic group and to rob the
people.”

A key area where Chávez and Maduro employed their populist rhetoric was the environment.
Despite being known for active participation at international climate conferences and keeping up
with most major climate treaties, Venezuela has always had a fundamentally anti-environmental
regime stemmed from its reliance on oil and mineral extraction.
Venezuela has a deep reliance on oil extraction, especially through its state-owned oil
company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA) (Baena, 2019; Berg, 2021; Hellinger, 2016,
2021; Wiseman & BéLand, 2010). The Orinoco Oil Belt accounted for 95% of the country’s
export, earnings around 55% of the federal budget as for 2012. Chávez’s Sowing the Oil Crop
plan (Plan Siembra Petrolera) aimed to produce 4 million barrels of oil a day by 2014 and 10
million by 2030 (Heinrich Boell Foundation, 2012). Regulations over oil extractions were
minimized over the years to generate greater profit at the expense of environmental protection.
For example, between 2010 and 2016, PDVSA self-reported more than 46,000 oil spills and
announced that it would stop reporting them starting from 2016 (Berg, 2021). In July 2020, the
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El Palito refinery leaked over 20,000 barrels of oil into the water, spreading to the protected
Morrocoy National Park (ibid.). And in June 2021, an oil tank at Punta Cardón in Falcón State
leaked 3.6 million liters of gasoline over nice days, through a crack in its base resulted from the
lack of maintenance since 2016 (ibid.). Venezuela also ranks as the top seven countries in the
world for gas flaring, the combustion of natural-gas byproducts that releases a considerable
amount of methane into the atmosphere (ibid.). All these examples show how Venezuela not
only relied heavily on resource extraction but was also conducive to additional environmental
damages caused by the extractions.
Reacting to international sanctions on oil exports, Maduro shifted its extractive focus to
expand mining in the Orinoco Mining Arc (Arco Minero del Orinoco). This mining arc opened
up 112,000 square kilometers of the Amazon rainforest—some of the most biodiverse areas of
the Amazon rainforest and borders Canaima National Park, a UNESCO World Heritage Site—
for mining. It contains proven reserves of thousands and millions of tons of gold, diamonds, iron,
bauxite, copper, coltan, etc. (Ebus, 2018; Notilogía, 2016; Rendon, 2020). No environmental
impact assessment in the region was carried out despite being mandated by law (Ebus, 2018).
Moreover, the Maduro regime has been reported to use state security to facilitate rampant
criminal mining groups to extract, process, and sell minerals (Rendon, 2020).
These actions under Chávez and Maduro proved an assessment of Venezuelan
environmental governance by the EU in 2007 (European Commission, 2007). It concluded that:
“A significant gap remains between the advanced framework and apparent political
willingness of the authorities on one hand, and continued difficulties in relation to the
country’s environmental performance and achievements. Particular challenges include
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deforestation, desertification, a reduction in biodiversity, insufficient management of
waste and pollution caused by industry, agriculture, and mining areas.”
In this context of Chávez and Maduro’s left-wing populist rhetoric and their anti-environmental
projects, three following sections unpack how their anti-environmental agendas are anchored in
three populist elements. These three elements are: 1). Anti-Capitalism, framing the economic
elites as the enemy who exploits natural resources for selfish gains at the expense of the
Venezuelan people; 2). Anti-imperialism, framing foreign powers as a threat to Venezuelan
national sovereignty which needs to be defended with national control over Venezuela’s natural
resources; and 3). People-centricity, promising to defend and benefit ordinary Venezuelan
citizens with resource extraction.
Before diving into each populist element in detail, I begin with a section that analyzes
Chávez’s world-renowned speech at the 2009 Copenhagen UN Climate Change Conference.
This speech shows a convergence of Chávez’s three populist elements anchoring his antienvironmental agendas. After this section, three subsequent sections unpack each populist anchor
of Venezuela’s anti-environmental agendas in more detail.
The evidence for the following sections is drawn from Chávez and Maduro’s speeches,
official party documents and government policies, press releases, and relevant secondary
journalistic and scholarly sources.

Anchoring Rhetoric: A Convergence of Chávez’s Anti-environmental Agendas’ Populist
Anchors
In 2009, one of the most important UN Climate Change Conferences was held in
Copenhagen. There, Chávez delivered the speech on climate that he was most known for. It was
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a 15-minute tirade blaming the deteriorating state of the environment on Capitalism, the
“imperial dictatorship” of the developed countries, and the exploitation of the ordinary people by
the elites and the super-rich. This speech is a perfect example showing the convergence of all
three key populist elements in Chávez’s anti-environmental agendas.
Before diving into the speech itself, one clarification is needed. The speech delivered by
Chávez at this summit was not explicitly anti-environmental at first glance. He actually
acknowledged and highlighted that “climate change is undoubtedly the most devastating
environmental problem of this century” (Chávez, 2013). Yet, consistent with his implicit
domestic anti-environmental agendas was that he shifted the blames for causing and the burdens
of addressing climate change to developed countries. Thus, he justified letting developing
countries like Venezuela carry minimum responsibilities for addressing climate change. Along
these lines, Chávez advocated, “Developed countries should set binding, clear and concrete
commitments for the substantial reduction of their emissions and assume obligations of financial
and technological assistance to poor countries to cope with the destructive dangers of climate
change” (ibid.).
In this speech, Chávez was vocal about anti-Capitalism, an unusual position to take on
international platforms. Yet it was consistent with Chávez’s populist and Socialistic agendas.
Capitalism and the economic elites were crucial to his populist construction of the evil enemies.
He said, “Let’s talk about the cause, let’s not evade responsibilities, and let’s not evade the depth
of this problem. The cause, undoubtedly…is the destructive metabolic system of capital and its
embodied model: Capitalism” (ibid.). Capitalism breeds an extremely uneven social structure,
leading to differential responsibilities to climate change. Chávez claimed that “we are profoundly
unequal...Seven percent is responsible, these 500 million richest people are responsible for 50
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percent of emissions, while the poorest 50 percent accounts for only seven percent of emissions”
(ibid.). By framing the economic elites under Capitalism as the ultimate culprits for the climate
crisis, Chávez also painted them as enemies of the people. The economic elites selfishly chose
not to take responsibility for the harm they caused as Chávez mocked them, “If the climate were
a bank, it would have been saved already” (ibid.).
Another key enemy of the people in Chávez’s populist environmental rhetoric was the
imperial powers, led by the U.S. and other developed countries. He claimed that “what we are
experiencing on this planet is an imperial dictatorship, and from here we continue denouncing
it…There is a group of countries that consider themselves superior to us in the South, to us in the
Third World, to us, the underdeveloped countries” (ibid.). Developed countries are the
wrongdoers who exploited smaller countries under neoliberalism and imposed on them
environmental degradation and economic backwardness. The current situation was believed to be
single-handedly caused by these global powers whose “political conservatism and
selfishness…show high insensitivity and lack of solidarity with the poor, the hungry, and the
most vulnerable to disease, to natural disasters” (ibid.).
Last but not least, following the framing of the enemies, the populist rhetoric is not
complete until one advocates for the oppressed, ordinary people. Chávez referred to this point
towards the end of his speech, concluding that “we the peoples of the world ask of the empires,
to those who try to continue dominating the world and exploiting us…let’s stop environmental
degradation and avoid the great catastrophe of climate change, let’s integrate ourselves into the
noble goal of everyone being more free and united” (ibid.). It echoed both his Socialist platforms
and the branding of himself as the true leader of the people.

93

1. Anti-Capitalism: Reclaiming Resources from the Elites in a Socialist State
As left-wing, Socialist, populist leaders, Chávez and Maduro naturally incorporated antiCapitalist framings into their anti-environmental rhetoric. Law of the Homeland Plan: Second
Socialist plan for the Economic and Social Development of the Nation 2013~2019 (Ley del Plan
de la Patria: Segundo Plan Socialista de Desarrollo Económicoy Social de la Nación 20132019, abbreviated as LHP) was a comprehensive plan presented by PSUV in 2013, laying out
main socio-economic objectives and policy orientations for the country. In its opening section on
“The plan of the homeland, a new phase of the Bolivarian Revolution,” objective II aimed “to
continue building the Bolivarian socialism of the 21st century in Venezuela as an alternative to
the destructive and savage system of capitalism and thereby ensure the ‘greatest amount of social
security, the greatest amount of political stability and the greatest amount of happiness’ for our
people” (Venezuela, 2013, pp. 4-5). It is a perfect example of the populist dualism between the
corrupt Capitalism and the happiness of the people, where promoting the latter by destroying the
former is Chávez’s populist priority.
This anti-Capitalist goal was translated into various environment-related policy proposals
in the same document, such as Objective 2.1 on oil extraction, “Transcending the capitalist oil
rentier model towards the socialist productive economic model, based on the development of the
productive forces” (ibid., 13). Similar rhetoric was also used on international platforms. Claudia
Salerno, the top negotiator for Venezuela at the UN’s Doha Climate Change Conference,
criticized the idea of carbon trading as “mechanisms to take profit of a certain kind of pollution”
(Salerno, 2012). This justified Venezuela’s objections to pro-environmental carbon trading on
the grounds of refusing to be taken hostage by the global Capitalist system.
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Along the lines of denouncing Capitalism was the antagonization of the economic elites.
One prominent group that was consistently vilified by Chávez was PDVSA’s managers, prior to
nationalization. Chávez employed the populist rhetoric to name them an “exploitative
international ruling elite” who amassed resources and wealth at the expense of the general
Venezuelan people (Wiseman & BéLand, 2010). To take control back from the elites, Chávez
announced that “PDVSA belongs to all Venezuelans…This petroleum elite, which for years
managed the enterprise that belongs to all Venezuelans…there was always hidden a deep antinational and anti-Venezuelan sentiment” (ibid.). This villainization of the oil elites helped to
justify Chávez’s push to nationalize PDVSA and to legitimize the flow of extensive oil revenue
into the government’s funds.

2. Anti-imperialism: Oil and Mining as Symbols of National Sovereignty
As a former Spanish colony fought its way to independence, Venezuela has antiimperialism running deep in its veins. This historical sentiment has been elevated by Chávez and
Maduro’s populist regime to another level, especially for justifying the exploitation of the
country’s natural resources such as oil and minerals.
The first step of integrating anti-imperial sentiments into the populist anti-environmental
rhetoric was to establish the antagonism and enmity between the Venezuelan nation and foreign
powers. The most intensive attack on foreign countries, other than from Chávez’s 2009 UN
speech, was targeted at U.S. sanctions imposed on pro-Maduro parties and businesses for
Maduro’s violation of democratic principles and human rights, particularly sanctions on oil
export. Maduro called it a “total oil blockade by the North American empire; of the total
persecution by imperialism” (Albacity.org, 2020) and “sanctions against us are a serious
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violation of Venezuelans’ human rights. And it’s not only a cruel mechanism that attacks the
population…[but also] to prompt a regime change” (Maduro, 2021). Consistently, Maduro used
hostile language to describe these sanctions with phrases like “assault,” “persecution,” and
“sabotage” (Palmigiani, 2021). He set up the U.S. and its Western allies as enemies trying to
bend Venezuela to their demands or to turn the Venezuelan government into their puppet for its
natural resources.
In response to these carefully constructed imperial enemies abroad, Maduro’s second
populist step was to frame himself as the staunch defender of Venezuela’s national sovereignty,
independence, and freedom. He was not afraid to confront foreign powers head-on. In an
interview with the BBC in 2019, Maduro addressed these international “aggressions” directly by
distinguishing Venezuela from other oil-rich countries troubled by relations with the U.S. He
declared that “Venezuela is not Iran or Libya, Venezuela has its capacity. We will confront all
these issues and be assured that all those campaigns of media aggression, of lies, we will slowly
start to conquer them with reality” (Maduro, 2019). In a general debate of UN’s 75th session,
Maduro’s speech carried a similar message, claiming that “neither an illegal embargo nor
aggression against our government have taken us off our path to protect the lives of our people.
We are resisting this criminal, inhuman aggression…We’re fighting for peace, for our homeland,
for our region, for humanity” (United Nations, 2020). Instances like these helped to boost
Maduro’s strongman image as a populist leader who would defend the country’s natural
resources, sovereignty, and people against international aggressors.
This populist anti-imperialist rhetoric was not simply manifested in a defensive stance
against foreign powers. Chávez and Maduro took the anti-imperialist spirit a step further to
construct the idea of oil sovereignty. Chávez was its original architect who made oil a symbol of
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national sovereignty in Venezuela. Economic independence gained from oil revenue symbolizes
Venezuela’s anti-imperialist struggles and national pride (Wiseman & BéLand, 2010). During
the process of nationalizing PDVSA, Maduro “redefined [its role] in line with the broader
national interest” (Buxton, 2003, p. 125) as public ownership of oil became synonymous with the
populist and Socialist promises of economic equality among the people.
Chávez translated anti-imperialism and oil sovereignty into policy proposals in LHP,
guided by “the fourth major historic objective…to move forward in the search for a multi-centric
and pluripolar world, without imperial domination and with unrestricted respect for the selfdetermination of peoples” (Venezuela, 2013, pp. 4-5). Elaborating on this principle was “Policy
27. Oil Sovereignty: To reduce the economic, industrial and technological dependence of the
national oil industry…that strengthen Full Oil Sovereignty,” and to “develop Industrial
Conglomerates and Petro-industrial Bases in the Orinoco Oil Belt” with industrial advancements,
expansion of oil transportation systems, and developments of oil-related technologies
(Venezuela, 2013, p. 33). These actions eventually fed into Chávez’s promise of using “oil to
make local capital instead of foreign capital" to invest into Socialist programs for the ordinary
Venezuelan citizens (Parker, 2005, p. 45).
Resonating with Chávez’s framing of oil extraction as a symbol of national sovereignty,
Maduro (2021) reiterated its importance by saying that “Venezuela has a right to produce oil
freely, to sell it, to make profit from it, to comply with international regulations, to provide for its
people…We want to reach 1,500,000 barrels of petroleum production.” In addition to oil
extraction, another anti-imperialist weapon wielded by Maduro was the control and expansion of
the mining industry. Maduro and the minister of ecological mining development Robert Mirabal
saw gold production in Orinoco Mining Arc as a symbol of national victory in the “economic
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war” against foreign sanctions and of the success of the Venezuelan “productive model”
(Rosales, 2017).

3. For the People: Prioritizing Venezuelan People’s Well-being and Agency
There is no populism without putting people under the spotlight. Alongside setting up the
dual identities of the enemy—Capitalist elites and imperial powers—in their populist antienvironmental agendas, Chávez and Maduro directly appealed to the ordinary Venezuelan people
by promising them a centerpiece of the state’s profitable oil and mining operations. This framing
is consistent with Zúquete’s (2008, p. 92) characterization of Chavismo as a form of “missionary
politics” in which a charismatic leader “leads a chosen people gathered into a moral community
struggling against all-powerful and conspiratorial enemies, and engaged in a mission toward
redemption and salvation.”
The well-being of the Venezuelan people was framed as the foundation for Chávez and
Maduro’s anti-environmental agendas. In the opening passages of LHP, the populist project was
framed as a tool to achieve “the greatest social happiness and political stability for the
Venezuelan people, under the socialist thinking and action of the Supreme Commander and
Leader of the Bolivarian Revolution, Hugo Chávez” and “to continue advancing in the full
satisfaction of the basic necessities for the life of our people” (Venezuela, 2013, pp. 2, 4).
Specific policies were proposed to achieve these populist goals, including the expansion of
domestic oil extraction as discussed in earlier sections. When presenting LHP to the country,
Chávez declared that it was the people who "will be in charge of the program" (ibid.). LHP was
established not only as a program designed for the people, but also as a deeply democratic
program to give initiatives back to the people.
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This type of grassroots action called on by Chávez was also shown in the case of oil
workers taking control of oil installations prior to their nationalization in 2007. Venezuela's oil
minister Rafael Ramirez described it as "President Chávez has ordered us to take full control
over the sovereignty of our oil, and we are doing that today," paving the way for nationalization
and expansion of oil extraction in Venezuela at the turn of the decade (Elliott, 2007). Chávez was
able to justify the nationalization of oil companies because he instructed the oil minister Tareck
El Aissami and the president of PDVSA Asdrúbal Chávez, to “speak with the working class, to
recover everything…and to guarantee that our PDVSA shines and flies high for the benefit of
our Venezuela” (Albacity.org, 2020). Maduro later signed a decree extending the leadership of
the Ali Rodríguez Araque Presidential Commission in PDVSA to tighten his control over oil
production with the same people-centric logic.
Maduro’s development of the Orinoco Mining Arc was also justified in the name of the
people. Maduro claimed that small-scale miners and indigenous communities were included in
the mining arc’s new development model and that the state was able to manage areas rampant
with illegal mining and gang-related violence (Rosales, 2017). Although neither action were
confirmed to be true (Ebus, 2018), Maduro was able to exploit this populist rhetoric of
safeguarding the rights and security of minority people to push through mining expansion. In his
Twitter post promoting the development of the mining arc, Maduro claimed that “Venezuela has
a Mining Sector Plan 2019-2025… we will move towards the prosperity and happiness of the
people” (NicolasMaduro, 2019).
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IX. Discussion

These four case studies show that populist parties manifest greater variations in the
directions they have taken on environmental agendas than what the literature has suggested.
Multiple parties, even right-wing parties, have promoted broad pro-environmental agendas, and
each party emphasized different environmental issues in their respective environmental agenda.
None of this has been fully captured by previous scholarship.
More importantly, these case studies demonstrate that despite variations along party lines
and environmental stances, populist parties ultimately anchor their environmental agendas in
their populist rhetoric. These framing anchors are generally grounded in three features of
populism: people-centricity, nationalism, and anti-elitism. In addition to this core argument, in
the following sections, I discuss four additional findings from the case studies: 1) group
variations in environmental agendas’ populist anchors among cases and their core consistencies;
2) the environment as a secondary issue in the populist core; 3) the outward-facing construction
of the enemy on environmental issues; and 4) sustained consensus on the acknowledgment of
environmental issues.

1. Group Variations in Framing Anchors of Populist Parties’ Environmental Agendas
At first glance, the populist anchors of each parties’ environmental agendas seem to
converge into three core populist elements: people-centricity, nationalism, and anti-elitism. Yet,
just from these four cases, considerable variations in their populist framing strategies can be
observed. The following two sub-sections will shed light on them. Along the lines of the
operationalization of this thesis, I first discuss the variations along party lines, and then along
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positions of their environmental agendas. Finally, I circle back to stress the populist framing
consistency of these parties’ environmental agendas.

1.1 Party-family variations
For right-wing populist parties, exclusive nationalism has been one of their core features
to appeal to supporters (Dunn, 2013; Wodak, KhosraviNik, & Mral, 2013). It underlies some of
their key policy orientations such as opposition to immigration and hostility towards free trade.
The same tendencies are manifested in the U.S.’s and France’s right-wing populist parties’
environmental agendas. Both parties’ rhetoric draws extensively from nationalistic ideas,
rejecting any international treaties or collaborations, and taking matters into their own hands.
Sovereignty is key in these cases, especially energy sovereignty which underpins policies on
resource extraction and energy generation to ensure a country is self-sufficient in energy. Both
parties equate national interests with the people’s interests, framing themselves as guardians of
the people by prioritizing the country’s environmental needs ahead of anything else. In the U.S.,
this has taken the form of “American-first” principles, while in France, it is incarnated in the idea
of “nationalistic green localism.
For left-wing populist parties, the most prominent shared feature is populist Socialism.
Both parties pushed for the nationalization of private companies in key energy sectors. Indeed,
nationalization polices do reflect the influences of nationalistic values, yet these populist parties’
focuses differ from right-wing nationalism in two ways. Firstly, the nationalization proposed in
Spain and Venezuela did not exclusively target foreign companies, but mostly domestic
companies. Nationalization was translated into the Socialist populist idea of the people’s
democratic public ownership. Secondly, and despite Chavez’s aggressive anti-imperialist
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campaign, these two parties have been quite receptive to the international community at many
levels, such as Venezuela’s track record of ratifying UN climate treaties and Spain’s moderate
attitudes towards the EU and other international organizations. Hence, both parties’ policy
emphasis on nationalization aligns with their populist Socialist appeals. In addition, both parties
have a greater proportion of their language explicitly referencing the people and Socialist values
than do right-wing parties, further demonstrating their key framing anchor in populist Socialism.
Another key difference between left- and right-wing populist parties’ environmental
agendas’ framing anchors is that right-wing populist leaders tend to address environmental issues
more directly and explicitly than left-wing populists do. Both Le Pen and Trump spent
considerable time and energy talking about the environment directly throughout various
campaigns and touched on many issues ranging from energy to natural resources, from
conservation to human well-being. They also continued their populist style of using
inflammatory and emotional language around the environment, either defending their own
agendas or attacking enemies’ policies or intentions. Conversely, left-wing populist parties
omitted many key environmental issues from their agendas. For Podemos, even though they had
run on a pro-environmental agenda from day one, there was little source material on their actual
language or policies on environmental issues, as compared to the other three. For Venezuela,
both Chavez and Maduro danced around most environmental issues by focusing on resource
extraction and by shifting the responsibility for environmental actions to developed countries.

1.2 Environmental orientation variations
The main difference in environmental agenda framing between pro- and antienvironmental populist parties comes down to their environmental agendas’ levels of specificity.
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Anti-environmental populists tend to advocate for specific policy directions while proenvironmental ones tend to rely on the principle of direct democracy and leave more room for
citizens to decide.
Anti-environment populist parties in Venezuela and the U.S. have presented clear
environmental agendas backed by a variety of national policies. In Venezuela, both Chavez’s and
Maduro’s regimes were underpinned by strong-willed resource-extraction policies. The former
concentrated on oil extraction marked by the nationalization of the PDVSA and the opening of
the Orinoco Oil Belt for drilling; the latter focused on opening up mining operations in the
Orinoco Mining Arc. In the U.S., there was a large repertoire of legislation under Trump aimed
at striking down environmental protection and opening up natural resources and land for
economic activities (Popovich et al., 2021). Both of their rhetorical repertoires also resonated
with this level of assuredness with decisive tones and clear references to particular legislations,
working with a clear pathway and explicit agendas.
On the other hand, pro-environment populists tend to be more vague in their agendas’
environmental initiatives. They do, however, tend to focus more on the mechanisms through
which pro-environmental actions could be done, instead of laying out concrete steps. Indeed,
both Le Pen and Iglesias presented signature pro-environmental packages during their
campaigns. RN had the New Ecology movement and Podemos had both the Green New Deal and
the Green Horizon Plan. Yet, partly because of their limited campaign success, none of their
environmental proposals were widely implemented. More importantly, judging from the
proposals themselves, the scope of issues covered, and the number of directly applicable policies
fell short in general. The New Ecology movement relied heavily on the principles of patriotic
ecology, localism and regional self-determination, and the New Ecology Collective press releases

103

overwhelmingly focused on environment-related comments or criticisms over other
organization’s policies rather than proposing actions. Neither the Green New Deal nor the Green
Horizon Plan by Podemos presented a clear roadmap for policymaking. Rather, they were
mostly rhetorical campaign tools that left space open for citizens to decide under direct
democracy.

1.3 Populist framings after all: consistencies among variations
Despite the variations observed across the four case studies, one consistency—at the
heart of this thesis’s argument—is that all populist parties anchor their environmental agendas in
populist principles and frame them with populist language. The variations act as powerful proof
to show that even with such a diverse pool of populist environmental agendas, strategies, and
orientations, they ultimately fall under the command of a populist core. The unwavering strength
of their populist rhetoric serves as an anchor for each of their environmental agendas to fit into
their overall populist political campaigns. The next section builds on this point.

2. The Environment as a Secondary Issue to the Populist Core
The second observation from these case studies is that the populist parties’ environmental
agendas are secondary to core issues closer to the heart of populism. Parties did not adjust their
populist rhetoric or principles to fit the path of their environmental agendas. Rather, it was the
opposite; populist parties framed their environmental agendas—whichever direction they took—
in a way that fit their overall populist framework and key features of their populist rhetoric. This
observation of environmental issues being secondary to the populist core is consistent with
Duina and Carson’s (2019) study. They found that far-right populist parties in Europe were able
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to adapt to and incorporate inclusive and progressive agendas which come secondary to their
populist core on nationalism and European superiority.
Populist parties adapt their environmental agendas to fit the national context and to
justify them under their populist frameworks. The differential pursuit of energy sources by
Venezuela and France is exemplary of how contrary policies have been justified by the same
populist element— nationalism. Venezuela’s populist leaders justified fossil fuel extraction and
mineral mining as patriotic because they boost national economic sovereignty in the face of
imperial threats from the West. In France, however, the promotion of cleaner nuclear power over
fossil fuel was a key step towards French “national sovereignty.”
In each case, the core populist features the case study countries employed were kept
intact, and even reinforced when they embedded different environmental agendas. The populist
logic remained coherent and rational because they had framed environmental agendas to fit them
into their populist core. Therefore, regardless of how central environmental issues are to their
populist parties’ campaigns, their environmental agendas remain secondary to their populist core.
In these four case studies, we have yet to see any key aspect of these parties’
environmental framing transcend or challenge the scope of their populist frameworks. Even for
instances in which the populist parties’ environmental rhetoric is internally contradictory—such
as Trump’s unusual appreciation for the American natural environment and conservation, and
Chavez’s acknowledgment of the severity of climate change—they still adhere to their parties’
populist core. Moreover, I predict that environmental issues will remain peripheral to the core
concerns of populist parties for a long time to come. They will remain secondary to concerns
over immigration, national sovereignty, globalization, and the political elite. This could be
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especially true concerning the pro-environmental populist parties with their limited success in
implementing their policy proposals, in spite of being vocal on pro-environmental fronts.
Further, there are inherent incompatibilities between core populist features and
environmentally favorable policy orientations that may render the scholarly emphasis on populist
partiers’ overwhelming anti-environmental image true on a more essentialist level. For example,
the global nature of climate change is inherently in conflict with nationalistic elements of
populism, and pro-environmental policies constrained by national borders are curtailed. Yet,
populist parties have yet to compromise on treating national boundaries as limits of
environmental policies. Pro-environment populist parties will be tested when this conflict
between the international nature of climate change and their insistence on nationalistic policy
solutions exacerbates. Stressors on this front can come from the predicted increase in climate
displacement and climate migration in the upcoming years. Populist parties could get away with
their framing strategies as long as there is no conflict between their primary concerns and
secondary issues. It is when such conflict arises and becomes unavoidable that the populist
parties may be forced to re-frame their stances on secondary issues to preserve their primary
ideologies.

3. The Outward-facing Construction of the Enemy on Environmental Issues
Continuing the conversation on issues populist parties face when confronting the global
nature of climate change, the third observation these four case studies offer is that populist
parties, when it comes to framing around environmental agendas, are forced to look outward to
frame and respond to issues related to international actors.
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It would be impossible to ignore the role of international organizations or foreign
countries in climate change. Thus, populist parties devote a considerable portion of their
environmental rhetoric to framing both international organizations and foreign countries. They
all tend to stick with their populist nationalistic core and antagonize foreign states or institutions.
This takes multiple forms such as dismissing or pulling out of international climate treaties, and
painting other countries as enemies to national sovereignty and/or energy security.
This focused antagonization of international actors in populist environmental rhetoric can
broaden our understandings of the populist framing of the “enemy.” Enemies in this case are no
longer domestic groups based on ethnic identities or immigration status, but are stretched to the
institutional level to include particular rival nation-states or international organizations. This is
supported by what Brubaker (2017a) has characterized as “horizontal” opposition between
insiders (the people) and outsiders (the enemy). The latter refers to a broad constellation of
“impersonal forces or institutions” threatening the people’s way of life or security, such as
“globalization, unfettered trade, the European Union…” (Ibid.).
Extrapolating from the case studies, this type of antagonization of foreign institutions can
trigger two types of populist framings: offensive and defensive. The offensive stance can be seen
in the U.S. where Trump’s rhetoric of responding to international enemies was aggressive
competition in the international stage and making America the leading power on environmentalrelated issues to crush enemies. Conversely, the defensive stance is evidenced in the French and
Venezuelan cases. Both parties’ reactions to foreign enemies were not to outcompete them like
Trump had done. Rather, they framed their strategies along the lines of self-sufficiency and
national sovereignty, not seeking to assert their dominance abroad to overtake their enemies.
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4. The Last Global Consensus Standing? The Undeniability of Environmental Problems
Lastly, zooming out from the details of case studies, one surprising take-away is that
despite the variations in populist parties’ environmental agendas alone positions on the
environment, it is difficult for them to take outright antagonistic stances towards the
environment.
Even when populist parties have adopted broadly anti-environmental agendas such as in
the U.S. or in Venezuela, there have remained sporadic moments—sometimes on prominent
stages such as Chávez’s speech at the UN Climate Conference in Copenhagen—when both
parties’ leaders have acknowledged existing environmental problems4 and the necessity of
environmental protections. This trend coincides with climate skeptics’ recent change of tactics
from outright climate denial to various forms of climate skepticism, since the former is losing
traction with the public as both theoretical and real-life evidence of climate change becomes
harder to refute (Runciman, 2017).
The compromise populist anti-environmental parties took to echo, or at least
acknowledge, pro-environmental sentiments is particularly astounding. This is because populist
parties are famous for, and gain much of their popularity from, being the party to break
international norms on various issues. There is a long track record of populist leaders across the
world ruthlessly overturning consensus on many global issues such as women’s rights,
LGBTQIA+ rights, the benefits of globalization, the recognition of international organizations,
and neutral or favorable attitudes towards immigration. Populist parties’ consensus on
acknowledging environmental problems could be a breakthrough issue where they share

This is not necessarily the reality of climate change since Trump had banned the use of the term “climate change”
in certain cases (McKibben, 2017), and had been an open climate denier throughout his years in office.
4
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commonalities with the global consensus, regardless of the directions they take on environmental
issues.
Yet, for two reasons, one should not be too optimistic about this turn of the events.
Firstly, the ingenuity of anti-environmental populist parties’ acknowledgment of environmental
problems is questionable since they pursue hostile policies on many environmental fronts. The
pro-environment sentiments also could be seen as mere gestures to maintain their appearances in
certain instances such as Earth Day for Trump and the UN Climate Summits for Chávez.
Secondly, consistent with studies on populist parties’ strategic leveraging of environmental
political opportunities to gain electoral support (Oswald et al., 2021), these good-faith proenvironmental acknowledgements are similar to opportunistic gestures aimed at gaining political
capital for these populist parties.
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X. Conclusion

I have chosen the four case studies—the Republican Party under Trump, the RN under Le
Pen, Podemos under Iglesias, and Chávez and Maduro’s populist Socialist regime in
Venezuela—for their variations in party family (left- or right-wing) and positions of
environmental agendas (pro- or anti-environment). They provide evidence that populist parties’
environmental agendas, on both ends of the political spectrum, are more diverse and nuanced
than the literature has suggested.
One consistency I have found among these variations is that these four populist parties
ultimately anchor their environmental agendas in their populist rhetoric, specifically grounded in
three key features of populism: people-centricity, nationalism, and anti-elitism. With this broadly
consistent populist framing of environmental agendas in mind, populist parties do show
considerable variations in how they articulate the populist framing of their environmental
agendas. These variations can be observed among individual cases, along party lines, as well as
along their environmental agendas’ orientations. Right-wing populist parties tend to frame their
environmental agendas with exclusive nationalism as well as explicit language and policy
orientations. Left-wing populist parties frame them around the idea of populist Socialism as well
as being less comprehensive in policy coverage and implicit with language used. Parties tend to
frame their anti-environmental agendas with more confidence and specificity, while those with
pro-environmental agendas tend to be more vague and leave room for specific policies to be
decided by direct democracy.
This thesis also offers several ways through which these case studies can broaden
understandings of populism. Firstly, I demonstrate that environment issues come secondary to
core issues closer to the heart of populist concerns. I predict that populist parties will prioritize
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their stances on core issues if they conflict with their environmental agendas. One scenario could
be future mass climate displacement and migration which would pit populist parties’ nationalistic
core against the international nature of climate change. Secondly, as populist parties are forced to
respond to a global issue like climate change, I find that they are compelled to be more outwardfacing and tend to frame their enemies at an institutional level to include foreign countries and
international institutions. I extrapolate from the case studies that populist parties react to these
international, institutional enemies either offensively or defensively. Lastly, despite being
ingenuine and opportunistic in some cases, acknowledgement of environmental issues is
universal among populist parties—a rare moment of cross-party consensus on a single issue.
The evidence presented in this thesis is limited to four populist parties. However, if
correct and representative of the landscape of populist parties’ environmental agendas’ framing,
it raises important questions about our understanding of the relationship between populism and
the environment, as well as implications for the scholarly landscape of populism. Hence, I
propose several questions for further investigation following the initial exploratory step
undertaken by this thesis.
Firstly, more populist parties’ environmental agendas should be investigated to assess
whether they are all anchored in core elements of the populist rhetoric, and what new variations
they bring to the table. Many populist parties with emphasis on the environment could be
investigated, such as the AfD in Germany, Bolsonaro’s regime in Brazil, the PiS in Poland, and
the Five Star Movement in Italy. In addition, future studies could also account for an important
variation that is beyond the scope of this thesis—populist parties with inconsistent environmental
agendas. Investigation into RN could be broadened to achieve this since they were known for
climate denial prior to 2014. This variation could be particularly powerful in revealing the
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consistency of the populist framing and the anchoring of diverging environmental agendas
adopted by the same party over the years. Austria’s FPÖ and Germany’s AfD also fit into this
category.
Secondly, this thesis focuses on the rhetorical framing of populist parties’ environmental
agendas. Future studies could approach the topic from a more concrete and practical angle.
Researchers could investigate environmental policies enacted by these populist parties to assess
whether their actual policy orientations align with their populist political agendas.
Lastly, the predictions from the discussion chapter could be tested in future studies. If there are
cases of populist parties’ environmental agendas conflicting with their core issues, the argument
of the environment being a secondary populist issue could be tested. In addition, researchers
could also follow the proliferating stances on climate skepticism and their connections with
populist parties. As the fight against climate change intensifies, populist parties’ prominence and
their environmental agendas need to be explicated in more nuanced ways, as they could lead to a
new tide of resistance against the critical needs of international climate governance and climate
action.
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